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ABSTRACT—According to the standard account in American corporate law,
states compete to supply corporate law to American corporations, with
Delaware dominating the market. This “competition” metaphor in turn
informs some of the most important policy debates in American corporate
law.
This Article complicates the standard account, introducing foreign
nations as emerging lawmakers that compete with American states in the
increasingly globalized market for corporate law. In recent decades,
entrepreneurial foreign nations in offshore islands have used permissive
corporate governance rules and specialized business courts to attract publicly
traded American corporations. Aided in part by a select group of private
sector lawyers who draft legislation for these lawmakers, foreign nations
enable American corporations to opt out of mandatory rules that are
axiomatic features of American corporate law.
This Article documents an emerging international market for corporate
law that has largely been undetected by legal scholars who presuppose an
interstate market. While acknowledging the potential benefits offered by
foreign nations competing to attract American corporations, this Article
highlights a series of countervailing considerations that render any claims
about gains from international jurisdictional competition premature at best.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States seems cut off from the rest of the world when it
comes to corporate law. Legal scholars take as virtual gospel that corporate
law is a matter of state law, 1 and that states compete to sell their laws to
corporations by supplying corporate charters. 2 Delaware is widely regarded
1 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 REGULATION
26, 26 (2003) (“For over 200 years, corporate governance has been a matter for state law.”).
2 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1–3 (1993) [hereinafter
ROMANO, GENIUS].
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as the winner in this competition. Supplying corporate law to more than 66%
of Fortune 500 companies, 3 Delaware remains the central focus of academic
studies and a transactional lawyer’s prized tool kit. 4 For nearly half a century,
corporate law scholarship has been dominated by discussions about whether
other states put competitive pressure on Delaware and whether this
competition is normatively desirable. 5
There is a missing piece to this important body of scholarship. Until
now, legal scholars have neglected to consider foreign nations as
jurisdictions that compete with Delaware to supply corporate law. 6 This is
not particularly surprising. When theorists in economics and law laid the
theoretical foundations of corporate law in the 1970s and 1980s, 7 there was
little reason to consider the corporate law of foreign nations within the
framework of American corporate law. 8 At that time, only a small fraction of
3

See
About
the
Division
of
Corporations,
DEL.
DIVISION
CORP.,
https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency/ [https://perma.cc/5RDG-TKQW].
4 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2005) (noting that Delaware “has long been viewed as the de facto national
corporate law”).
5 Much of this discussion concerns whether a particular state law affords adequate protection for
shareholders and whether that protection ought to be left to private choice. Compare Ralph K. Winter,
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256
(1977) [hereinafter Winter, State Law] (“States seeking corporate charters will thus try to provide legal
systems which optimize the shareholder-corporation relationship.”), with Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1454 (1992) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Desirable Limits] (“[T]o the extent that we
find that a state’s interest in attracting incorporations will be served by adopting undesirable rules, we
can conclude that state competition is detrimental.”). In recent decades, Professor Mark Roe’s work has
complicated this picture by introducing the federal government as the de facto second American corporate
lawmaker. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) [hereinafter
Roe, Delaware’s Competition].
6 A brief word on terminology may be useful here. I use the term “foreign nations” loosely in this
Article, referring to jurisdictions with internationally recognized lawmaking authority. My definition thus
includes jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda that are technically not full sovereigns under
international law, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 282–84
(2d ed. 2006), but whose corporate lawmaking authority has been unquestioned under domestic
jurisprudence. See, e.g., In re Kingate Mgmt. Ltd. Litig., No. 09-CV-5386 (DAB), 2016 WL 5339538, at
*15–16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2016) (“The fact that Madoff and his fraudulent scheme arose out of New
York is not sufficient to override BVI’s interests in regulating the relationship between BVI corporations
and their shareholders. Accordingly, the Court finds that BVI law applies to the issue of standing.”).
7 Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325,
1326 (2013).
8 American corporate law was traditionally framed within the policy debate over federalism, with
state corporate codes being conceptualized as products “whose producers are states and whose consumers
are corporations.” ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at 6. The standard account implicitly limits the
“suppliers” of American corporate law to the constituent states of the United States. See id.; see also
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 5
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American companies were incorporated in foreign nations.9 Moreover,
leading scholars have long assumed that the internal affairs doctrine—a
conflict of laws principle that corporations can opt into any state’s corporate
law without regard to the location of their physical operations—only applies
to states in the United States. 10 If federal and state courts do not honor the
choices of corporations to incorporate abroad, foreign nations cannot
seriously compete with Delaware. But as I document below, judges routinely
extend the internal affairs doctrine for firms incorporated outside of the
United States. 11 Texas-based consumer giant Helen of Troy, Los Angelesbased weight management company Herbalife, and Kentucky-based clothing
company Fruit of the Loom are among hundreds of companies that are
effectively governed by the corporate law of foreign nations. 12
This Article develops a theoretical framework that accounts for the
emerging international market for corporate law. It contends that a handful
of foreign jurisdictions, including Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and
the Cayman Islands, have become emerging “laboratories” of corporate law
offering attractive corporate governance rules for publicly traded
corporations that principally operate outside of those jurisdictions. 13
American corporations are not immune to their seduction. These
jurisdictions—especially those I identify as “offshore corporate law
havens” 14—are already global market leaders for certain types of closely held
(1991) (“Managers in the United States must select the place of incorporation. The fifty states offer
different menus of devices (from voting by shareholders to fiduciary rules to derivative litigation) for the
protection of investors.”).
9 See infra Section II.A.
10 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L.
REV. 685, 698 (2009) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Race for the Bottom] (“[T]his country does not recognize
an internal-affairs doctrine in its dealings with other nations.” (emphasis omitted)).
11 See infra Section I.B.
12 See generally William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–15 (2019)
[hereinafter Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance] (explaining how particular industries have established
practices of setting up headquarters in offshore jurisdictions); Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and
the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1748–51 (2015) (compiling corporate
inversion transactions involving U.S. target companies between 1994 and 2014).
13 Conceptualizing jurisdictions as laboratories was popularized by Justice Louis Brandeis in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, explaining that a “[s]tate may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Professor Roberta Romano extended this concept to the corporate law
ecosystem, referring to states as “fifty laboratories.” ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at 5.
14 As I further elaborate in Part II, I use the term “offshore corporate law havens” in this Article
principally to refer to three jurisdictions that have successfully attracted clients based in the United States:
the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands. See E. EDWARD SIEMENS, OFFSHORE
COMPANY LAW 9 (2009). While all three jurisdictions are self-governing British Overseas Territories
(voluntarily), they each exercise almost full discretion when it comes to enacting legislation on corporate
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business entities, including mutual funds, hedge funds, and trusts. 15 But these
offshore jurisdictions are also starting to compete seriously for publicly
traded corporations. Today, foreign nations are juridical homes to over 14%
of large publicly traded corporations listed in American securities markets.16
There is virtually no literature on whether and to what extent foreign
nations compete with American states to supply corporate law. While legal
scholars and policymakers alike have been acutely aware of domestic
corporations reincorporating in offshore “tax havens,” 17 they have diagnosed
the phenomenon as a problem of tax. 18 While insightful, the foreign
incorporation trend cannot be entirely attributed to tax incentives.
As this Article will show, offshore corporate law havens in recent
decades have built sophisticated legal infrastructures that enable them to
compete with Delaware. For one, they have attracted a select group of
foreign lawyers who help lawmakers in these jurisdictions draft “cutting
edge” corporate law statutes. These lawmakers also rely heavily on
incorporation fees for government revenues, 19 allowing them to credibly
commit to retaining laws that are attractive to the private sector.20 Because
the population of offshore corporate law havens tends to be a fraction of even
sparsely populated states in the United States, 21 these jurisdictions can enact
law. The focus of this Article on these three jurisdictions is aimed at defining the concept of an
international market for corporate law and should not be taken to suggest that other foreign nations
besides these offshore jurisdictions do not or cannot attract American corporations. Indeed, many foreign
nations, including Ireland and the Marshall Islands, have had some success in drawing publicly traded
companies listed in American securities markets.
15 Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12, at 1, 3.
16 See infra Section II.A.
17 See, e.g., RONEN PALAN ET AL., TAX HAVENS: HOW GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 8–9 (2010)
(“[T]ax havens are places or countries (not all of them are sovereign states) that have sufficient autonomy
to write their own tax, finance, and other laws and regulations . . . . Tax havens are used, as their name
suggests, to avoid and evade taxes.”); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 276
(2010) (“In some circumstances, managers will opt to minimize taxes by choosing a tax haven or taxfriendly jurisdiction, even if that jurisdiction is suboptimal from the standpoint of corporate law.”).
18 See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter
Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2008) (observing that offshore incorporation is
“unabashedly all about tax reduction”).
19 The British Virgin Islands, for instance, has derived approximately half of its government revenues
from annual incorporation fees in recent years. See infra Section II.B.
20 A benign, economic-centric view would assess that the additional suppliers of corporate law lower
the transactional cost for creating standard templates of corporate governance rules. See infra Section
III.B. A more cynical view would be that their lawmakers are easily “captured” by private interests and
thereby prone to producing rules that may not be desirable from the society’s standpoint. See infra Section
III.B.
21 For instance, estimates show the population of the Cayman Islands is 61,944 compared to 961,939
in Delaware and 2,998,039 in Nevada. See Central America: Cayman Islands, CENT. INTELLIGENCE
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legislation swiftly in response to private sector demand. They also do not
confront the type of democratic accountability facing larger nations, or even
large states like New York or California, in part because they specialize in
producing laws for corporations that do not physically operate within their
territories. 22
Skeptical readers may point to the “unique” legal system in Delaware
that is said to make it near impossible for any other jurisdiction to mount a
serious challenge to Wilmington’s corporate law empire. I do not seek to
rehash the extensive and illuminating literature identifying Delaware’s
judicial system—particularly the renowned Delaware Court of Chancery—
as the predominant competitive advantage enjoyed by Delaware over other
states. 23 Indeed, many foreign jurisdictions do not offer a Delaware-style
legal system famous for producing an abundance of well-reasoned and factspecific case law appearing on Westlaw and Lexis. Instead, many legal
proceedings offshore take place in secret, and full-length opinions are
frequently unpublished or available only to insiders. 24
These jurisdictions compete not by carbon copying Delaware’s
judiciary, but rather by offering dispute resolution fora functionally similar
to modern commercial arbitration. Like arbitration, 25 courts in offshore

AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cj.html
[https://perma.cc/TVX3-C95L]; Delaware, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
profile?q=Delaware&g=0400000US10&table=DP05&tid=ACSDP1Y2018.DP05
[https://perma.cc/6JUM-KRBL]; Nevada, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
profile?q=Nevada&g=0400000US32&table=DP05&tid=ACSDP1Y2018.DP05
[https://perma.cc/FN9W-V9NL].
22 Indeed, offshore corporate law havens have enacted laws specifically for “exempted” or
“excepted” companies, which are designed for foreign business entities that do not (and in many instances
legally cannot) conduct any business in their territories. See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra
note 12, at 8–9. It is no coincidence that offshore incorporations havens are small in terms of population.
As is the case for Delaware, the small size of a jurisdiction minimizes competing political lobbies and
immunizes lawmakers from domestic factions that have interests in shaping corporate governance rules.
See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 885, 918–19 (1990); Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1452; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future
of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum
Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 762–63 (1987).
23 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000) [hereinafter Fisch, Peculiar Role] (attributing Delaware’s
success in attracting corporate charters to “the unique lawmaking function of the Delaware courts”);
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1009, 1017 (1997) [hereinafter Rock, Saints and Sinners] (asserting that the judgment of Delaware courts
plays an important role in evolving nonlegal norms of conduct).
24 See infra Section II.D.
25 Arbitration is a consent-based dispute resolution mechanism touted for offering efficient and
expert proceedings. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
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corporate law havens resolve disputes without juries. 26 Judges serving in
these courts, like arbitrators, are credentialed business law jurists, including
partners at major international law firms who fly in from overseas to preside
over cases ad hoc. 27
This account complicates some of the fundamental theoretical building
blocks underlying the study of American corporate law. Whereas several
prominent academics have assessed that other states do not vigorously
compete to give a run for Delaware’s money, thus dubbing the interstate
competition story a “myth,” 28 this Article suggests that a handful of foreign
nation states are actively vying to gain a share of the American corporate law
market. Thus, even if state-to-state competition is or will remain weak, 29
state-to-nation state competition may be alive and kicking, albeit not with
the same set of consequences that the standard interstate framework would
have us believe.
For example, offshore corporate law havens allow firms to opt out of a
range of corporate governance rules—including the ability of shareholders
to bring derivative suits for mismanagement—that are axiomatic features of
American corporate law. 30 While Delaware corporate law is predominantly
made up of “enabling” default rules that leave significant discretion to
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 723 n.90 (1999) (discussing the reduced cost and delay associated
with arbitration).
26 See infra Section II.D.
27 See infra Section II.D.
28 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV.
679, 684 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Myth] (“[T]he very notion that states compete for
incorporation is a myth. Other than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract
incorporations of public companies.”).
29 This premise is contested. For instance, Professor Romano maintains that “given Delaware’s
dominance, most other states engage in defensive competition, acting to retain domestic corporations,
rather than seeking to lure corporations away from Delaware and unseat it as the market leader.” Roberta
Romano, Market for Corporate Law Redux, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:
PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 358, 361–62 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter Romano,
Corporate Law Redux]. Others have argued that at least Delaware and Nevada “are vigorously attempting
to attract out-of-state incorporations.” Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a
Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 994 (2012).
30 Of course, the desirability of a liberal derivative suit regime is disputed (after all, defending
frivolous suits is costly). See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669, 692 (1986); Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder
Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 86 (2008); Charles J. Goetz, Verdict on Corporate Liability Rules
and the Derivative Suit: Not Proven, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 344 (1986) (evaluating the argument regarding
the effect of derivative suits on stock prices). But the general availability of derivative suits is said to
serve the dual purpose of compensating the injured shareholders and deterring managerial misconduct.
See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI
Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1345–46 (1993).
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private choice, 31 it includes a number of “mandatory” rules ranging from
fiduciary duty of loyalty to shareholder inspection rights. 32 These are rules
that even the most sophisticated corporations cannot waive compliance of
through contract. Viewed in this light, foreign jurisdictions enable
corporations to opt out of certain mandatory rules that may not be possible
in the pure domestic setting. This descriptive account thereby reorients the
normative debate concerning the proper boundaries and function of
corporate law.
By proposing an update to the interstate race framework underlying the
study of “American” corporate law, 33 this Article also adds an important
normative dimension critical to understanding a number of areas tertiary to
corporate law. After all, the interstate corporate charter competition literature
has been influential in a number of important areas of the law, including
bankruptcy law, tax policy, conflict of laws, trust law, environmental law,
and securities regulation. 34
31 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 2 (“The corporate code in almost every state is an
‘enabling’ statute. An enabling statute allows managers and investors to write their own tickets, to
establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a regulator.”); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752
(2006) (describing the Delaware corporate lawmaking process as driven in part by “enhancing flexibility
to engage in private ordering”).
32 See infra Section III.A.
33 I use quotes around “American” because there has been little systematic reflection about what
American corporate law even means. Scholars have long assumed it to mean corporate governance rules
produced by American states, supplemented with federal laws setting minimum standards. That seems
fair enough. But if we remove two shaky theoretical building blocks underlying that assumption—that
firms operating within the United States only shop among the corporate law of American states and that
the internal affairs doctrine only applies between states of the United States—it appears that we also ought
to care about the corporate law of foreign nations chosen by corporations with substantial factual nexus
to the United States. To put it bluntly with an extreme example, it helps very little to understand American
corporate law by studying the law of American states if 60% of American corporations choose to
incorporate in foreign nations. Even now, lawyers advising hedge fund managers based in the United
States would practically be committing malpractice if they were unfamiliar with the laws of the Cayman
Islands—the jurisdiction estimated to be home to upwards of 60% of the world’s hedge fund assets. See
Jan Fichtner, The Anatomy of the Cayman Islands Offshore Financial Center: Anglo-America, Japan,
and the Role of Hedge Funds, 23 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1034, 1051 (2016).
34 See, e.g., Marcus Cole, “Delaware Is Not a State”: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition
in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1847 (2002) (“[T]he advantages most often postulated for
Delaware’s dominance in corporate law do not carry over to corporate bankruptcy.”); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1247 (1992) (drawing on the corporate charter
competition literature to challenge “race-to-the-bottom arguments in the environmental context”); Robert
H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of
Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 363 (2005) (discussing the nature of jurisdictional
competition in the trust law context by engaging with the corporate charter competition literature). These
areas of the law are heavily influenced by jurisdictional competition theories, recognizing that rules are
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The remainder of this Article is organized in three Parts. Part I
synthesizes existing accounts and proposes a revision to the standard
interstate competition framework underlying the study of American
corporate law. Specifically, it develops a theoretical framework accounting
for the emerging international market for corporate law. Part II details the
corporate lawmaking processes in offshore corporate law havens, which are
severely understudied thus far. 35 This includes (1) data showing the extent to
which lawmakers in these jurisdictions are “captured” by foreign
corporations 36 by being heavily reliant on annual incorporation fees for
government revenue; (2) the inner workings of offshore law firms and other
local interest groups that facilitate efficient production of corporate law; and
(3) the emergence of specialized business courts featuring credentialed
business law jurists that resolve disputes swiftly (and in many cases,
secretly). Part III surveys important features of offshore corporate law,
highlighting how offshore corporate law havens enable corporations to opt
out of corporate governance rules that are largely immutable under Delaware
law. Part III also weighs the potential benefits offered by an emergence of
international competition against important negative externalities—effects
on third parties—present in the international setting. A short Conclusion
follows.

supplied in part through multiple lawmakers competing to supply their laws to private actors. See, e.g.,
Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1179, 1182–83 (2007) (“Just as state revenue from incorporation fees may encourage states to mold
corporate law to attract more corporations, this Article suggests that revenue from court fees encouraged
English courts to mold the common law to attract more cases.”). Leading thinkers typically agree that the
law is derived from or heavily influenced by jurisdictional competition, but vigorously disagree as to
whether the competition is normatively desirable. See Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 681–85.
35 See Robert Briant, Transactional Success Offshore? The Role of Corporate Lawyers, BUS. BVI
62, 63 (2015) (anecdotally describing the corporate lawmaking processes in offshore jurisdictions but
lamenting that “there are no studies or journal articles to cite as evidence of this practice”).
36 I use the term “capture” to refer to special interest groups exerting significant influence over the
local lawmaking process. See, e.g., Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 203, 203 (2006) (“According to the broad interpretation, regulatory capture is the process
through which special interests affect state intervention in any of its forms, which can include areas as
diverse as the setting of taxes, the choice of foreign or monetary policy, or the legislation affecting
R&D.”). In their strongest form, interest groups can literally write legislation that “captured” lawmakers
formally enact into law. For excellent discussions analyzing Delaware corporate law in the framework of
a capture model, see William W. Bratton, Delaware Law as Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and
the Basic Course After Twenty-Five Years, 34 GA. L. REV. 447, 453–61 (2000), and William W. Bratton
& Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation,
73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995).
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I. (NATION) STATES AS LABORATORIES OF CORPORATE LAW
This Part sketches the standard account underlying American corporate
law scholarship and develops a theoretical framework for understanding the
emerging international market for corporate law. Section A synthesizes the
prevailing literature that identifies states as potential competitors in the race
to supply corporate charters. Section B documents recent federal and state
court jurisprudence that effectively enables firms to choose the corporate law
of foreign nations without establishing any physical operations in the chosen
jurisdiction. Section B also advances this Article’s central thesis: that
Delaware and other states compete with foreign nations in the increasingly
globalized market for corporate law.
A. The Standard Account: States as Laboratories of Corporate Law
American corporate law is often characterized as a byproduct of a race:
states compete to supply corporate law. 37 For the most part, corporate law is
a collection of default rules governing the relations between the firm’s
shareholders (principals) and the managers (agents). 38 These rules serve to
remedy the various agency problems that arise when a large group of
individuals pool money and labor for business ventures. In the United States,
corporate law has historically been the domain of state law, although the
federal government sets minimum standards through statutes and
administrative guidelines. 39
The traditional view holds that states compete to supply corporate
charters in order to attract annual fees from locally incorporated
corporations. Enacting the first modern liberal corporate statute in 1896,
New Jersey was the early market leader, principally drawing corporations
physically headquartered in New York. 40 But when New Jersey enacted a
series of restrictive amendments to its statutes deemed unfriendly for
businesses in 1913, Delaware quickly took over New Jersey’s throne.41

37 See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 225, 226–27 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product].
38 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416,
1416 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract] (explaining that corporate law
“establishes minimum voting rules and restricts how managers can treat the firm and the investors”).
39 See Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1442.
40 See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L.
33, 81, 92–94 (2006).
41 See Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 249, 270–71 (1976).
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Delaware has since maintained an almost monopolistic advantage over other
states. 42
The view that this competition produces socially undesirable results is
most famously associated with former Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) chair William Cary. 43 Professor Cary argued in a widely cited piece
published in 1974 that competition between states to supply corporate
charters induced states to “race for the bottom” by adopting laws that favor
corporate insiders—namely directors and officers—over dispersed
shareholders. 44
Professor Cary’s thesis was attacked almost immediately, despite
enjoying a brief period of scholarly consensus. 45 Judge Ralph Winter set the
table for this takeover. 46 Judge Winter suggested that any competition
between states would result in a race for the top, because the market would
constrain managers from incorporating in a state that would be detrimental
to the shareholders’ interest. 47 While managers could technically choose any
state’s corporate law, if that choice was unfavorable to the shareholders’
interest, they would be outperformed, putting the managers’ employment in
jeopardy. Building on Judge Winter’s thesis, Professor Roberta Romano’s
wide-ranging theoretical and empirical studies have produced a generation
of followers who maintain that the race is for the top. 48 In doing so, Judge
42 See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2; Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s
Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008); David A. Skeel,
Icarus and American Corporate Regulation, 61 BUS. LAW. 155, 165 (2005) (calling Delaware “the most
important corporate law regulator since 1913”).
43 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 474 (1987) (“The race-to-the-bottom theory was presented most
forcefully in Professor William Cary’s famous article that gave rise to that phrase.”).
44 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 705 (1974). This view built on Justice Brandeis’s concern that a competition between states to
produce laws for corporations would induce state laws to capitulate to private corporate interests over
public interests. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–65 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
45 See Ralph K. Winter, Foreword to ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at ix (1993) (“Twenty years
ago, legal scholars were herdlike in regarding corporate law as a species of consumer protection in which
the law’s role was to protect helpless investors by hogtying a predatory corporate management.”).
46 Winter was a former Yale Law School professor and Senior Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. Ralph K. Winter, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SECOND CIR.,
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/judges/bios/rkw.html [https://perma.cc/75NH-CGAK].
47 See Winter, State Law, supra note 5, at 256.
48 Cf. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV.
757, 770 (1995) [hereinafter Klausner, Corporations] (“[T]here is a broad consensus that the finish line
of the race is closer to the top than the bottom.”). The “race for the top” account probably gained so much
following in no small part because of the ascendance of economics in the study of the law during the
1970s and the 1980s. This movement, in corporate law, successfully took down the notion that corporate
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Winter and Professor Romano successfully reshaped the dominant narrative
in corporate law: competition between states leads to efficient production of
corporate law while incentivizing socially beneficial corporate law
innovations. This view is probably the mainstream view among modern
corporate law circles, although the race for the bottom thesis continues to
enjoy support, in various iterations. 49
The idea that competition even exists between states has been subject
to sweeping revisionist accounts within the past two decades. 50 Professors
Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, for instance, have argued that the
competition metaphor is largely a “myth,” observing that “[o]ther than
Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations
of public companies.” 51 Specifically, Professors Kahan and Kamar showed
that no other state structures its corporate charter fees to attract publicly
traded companies. 52
law was a sovereign-based law and replaced it with economic theories suggesting that corporate law
constituted private contracts, amendable to private choice. Thus, corporate law today is predominantly
conceptualized as a nexus of standard form contracts, rather than a set of rules imposed by the state. See,
e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 38, at 1426 (referring to a corporation
as a “nexus of contracts”).
49 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?,
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 (2002) (finding that state competition over corporate charters provides
undesirable incentives that substantially affect corporate managers’ private interests); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from
Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999) (discussing the incentives states have to produce rules that
excessively protect incumbent managers and restrict hostile takeovers, often leading to rules that do not
maximize shareholder value); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1795 (2002) (finding that managers generally migrate to typical antitakeover statutes, which
increase managerial agency costs and reduce shareholder wealth, consistent with the “race to the bottom”
view).
50 Most of this debate is framed around competition for publicly traded corporations. Professor Ian
Ayres has observed that given the insignificance of close corporations for state revenues, there might not
be a race in the interstate context. See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365, 370 (1992). In a recent empirical study, Professors Bruce Kobayashi and Larry
Ribstein argued that Delaware is also the market leader for close companies. See Bruce H. Kobayashi &
Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies,
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 91 (“[W]e find evidence that large LLCs, like large corporations, tend to form
in Delaware, and that they do so for many of the same reasons—that is, for the quality of Delaware’s
legal system.”).
51 Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 684.
52 Id. at 687–88. Others, most notably Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, have called
the race a “leisurely walk,” observing that “other states have not been making any visible efforts to mount
a serious challenge to Delaware’s dominance.” Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race
or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 556
(2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk]. Professors Bebchuk and Hamdani attribute
Delaware’s preeminence in corporate law, instead, to network externalities. Id. at 559. The concept of
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Other challengers to the traditional state competition theory identify the
federal government in Washington D.C. as Delaware’s real competition.
Professor Mark Roe developed this argument in a series of law review
articles starting in 2003. 53 His argument is two-fold. First, Congress and the
SEC already have important pieces of corporate governance rules on the
books that displace certain segments of state corporate law.54 Thus, for
instance, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 sets the minimum
standards for proxy rules, 55 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandates
“internal managerial duties and allocates authority inside the firm.”56
Second, because federal authorities can always preempt state corporate law
under modern interpretations of the Commerce Clause, Delaware’s corporate
governance rules reflect “corporate law that the federal players tolerate.” 57
Many legal scholars now view the federal government as a significant

network externalities refers to the benefits of incorporating in a jurisdiction where a large number of other
firms have incorporated. See Klausner, Corporations, supra note 48, at 843–45. These benefits include
(1) a robust body of case law enhancing the predictability of the law; and (2) a large group of lawyers
who can efficiently provide legal services by the virtue of their extensive practice experience in one
jurisdiction. Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk, supra, at 586–87. Network externalities help explain
why Delaware has maintained a near monopolistic advantage in the corporate law world, even though
other states could easily copy and paste Delaware’s substantive law. Importantly, Delaware’s corporate
law statutes are typically written in open-ended language, all but guaranteeing a steady flow of cases. See
id. at 601.
53 See, e.g., Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 5; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125
(2009).
54 Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 10
(2009) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware and Washington] (“Washington makes corporate law . . . . It has made
the main rules governing insider trading, stock buybacks, how institutional investors can interact in
corporate governance, the structure of key board committees, board composition (how independent some
board members must be), how far states could go in making merger law, how attentive institutional
investors must be in voting their proxies, what business issues and transactional information public firms
must disclose (which often affect the structure and duties of insiders and managers to shareholders in a
myriad of transactions), the rules on dual class common stock recapitalizations, and duties and liabilities
of gatekeepers like accountants and lawyers, and more.”).
55 See Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1442 (“Federal law was totally silent on the
internal governance of corporations until the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933.”).
56 Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 5, at 598; see also id. at 633–34 (“Sarbanes-Oxley
mandates that the SEC make rules for audit committee independence. It controls executive compensation
by requiring that a class of bonuses be forfeited back to the company. It requires that the board’s audit
committee, not management, control the hiring and firing of accountants, as well as the ancillary business
that accountants do with the corporation. It mandates that audit partners rotate and pushes firms toward
rotating their accountants. It orders the SEC to grab control of off-balance-sheet transactions and special
purpose vehicles. It increases federal control over who may and may not sit on a corporate board. These
matters were once for state law. Not anymore.” (footnotes omitted)).
57 Id. at 644.
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contributor to American corporate law, principally by constraining
Delaware. 58
While these studies should be celebrated for complicating and refining
the study of American corporate law, they too tell an incomplete story. This
is because Delaware competes not just with its fellow states (and maybe the
federal government), but increasingly faces competition from foreign
nations. The absence of foreign nations in the prevailing account is
particularly notable if the market for corporate law is segmented: that is,
corporations might not only be looking to one leading jurisdiction producing
the “best” corporate law, but may also have an appetite for differentiated
corporate law “products.” 59 That is, even if Delaware continues to dominate
the market, there may be a significant number of firms looking for corporate
governance regimes that substantially deviate from that of Delaware. Thus,
no systematic study of American corporate law can be complete without
considering foreign nations that supply corporate law to “American”
corporations. The next Section develops a theoretical framework
conceptualizing foreign nations as Delaware’s emerging competition in the
increasingly globalized market for corporate law.
B. Nations as Laboratories of Corporate Law
Under the standard account of American corporate law, states alone
compete to supply corporate charters. This Article complicates the literature
by introducing foreign nations as emerging suppliers in the race.
To be clear, this is not the first time someone has written about
competition between nations to supply corporate law. For instance, there is
a growing body of literature acknowledging possible competition between
European nations, in part enabled by recent jurisprudence from the European
Court of Justice. 60
58 See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate
Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
953, 958 (2003).
59 Professor Michal Barzuza, drawing on Professor Michael Porter’s influential work on competitive
strategy, argued that the corporate law market may be explained by jurisdictions “dividing the market to
serve distinct consumer groups with similar demand preferences.” Barzuza, supra note 29, at 942 n.15
(citing MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND
COMPETITORS 196–200 (1980)). Judge Richard Posner and Professor Kenneth Scott advanced an earlier
version of the “market segmentation” thesis in 1980, hypothesizing that states differentiate their corporate
law products. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND
SECURITIES REGULATION 111 (1980).
60 See, e.g., Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT’L
L. 477, 480–81 (2004) (arguing that the European Community should adopt free choice in corporate law);
Martin Gelter, Centros and Defensive Regulatory Competition: Some Thoughts and a Glimpse at the
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Legal scholars have also occasionally acknowledged the alarming rates
at which American corporations are reincorporating in foreign “tax
havens.” 61 But prior discussions have almost exclusively centered around the
corporate inversion movement: American companies like Accenture
Consulting or Chiquita Bananas reincorporating in notorious “tax havens” to
reduce domestic tax liability. This line of scholarship tends to highlight the
problematic aspects of U.S. tax rules being bundled with corporate
governance rules, incentivizing domestic firms to choose “inferior”
corporate governance rules in order to receive tax benefits in offshore
havens. 62 For example, Professors Mitchell Kane and Ed Rock describe
corporate inversions as “unabashedly all about tax reduction.” 63 Professors
Kane and Rock warn that “tax-motivated corporate locational decisions can
lead to an efficiency cost to the extent that corporations are steered into
suboptimal legal regimes from a corporate law standpoint.” 64
In a more recent piece, Professor Eric Talley argues that foreign
incorporation introduces material legal risks, “since they move the locus of
corporate internal affairs out of conventional jurisprudential terrain and into
the domain of a foreign jurisdiction whose law is—by comparison—
recondite and unfamiliar.” 65 Unsurprisingly, Professor Talley assesses that
“a strong domestic corporate governance regime can provide a plausible
buffer against a tax-induced incorporation exodus.” 66
Data, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 467 (2019) (providing a partial theoretical and empirical analysis of
defensive regulatory competition); Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European
Corporate Law, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 247 (2005) (analyzing the structural conditions of competition on
the supply and demand sides of the market for European corporate law); Andrea Zorzi, A European
Nevada? Bad Enforcement as an Edge in State Competition for Incorporations, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 251 (2017) (stating that the possibility of one European state competing for a segment of the market
for incorporations cannot be ruled out). The European model of corporate law governance has also long
been on the radar of American corporate law scholars from a comparative law standpoint. See, e.g.,
ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at 128–40; Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1439.
61 See, e.g., Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–8
(2015).
62 See Fleischer, supra note 17, at 276 (“In some circumstances, managers will opt to minimize taxes
by choosing a tax haven or tax-friendly jurisdiction, even if that jurisdiction is suboptimal from the
standpoint of corporate law.”).
63 Kane & Rock, supra note 18, at 1230.
64 Id. at 1233.
65 See, e.g., Talley, supra note 12, at 1652.
66 Id. In a similar vein, Professor Omari Scott Simmons observed in an excellent piece that
Delaware’s preeminence is intertwined with America’s global strength, identifying “capital migration
toward foreign markets, the growing appeal of foreign stock exchanges, multi-jurisdictional litigation,
business firms eschewing courts for alternative dispute resolution, and corporate tax-inversion strategies”
as potential global threats. Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 217
(2015). On the other side of the spectrum, a few scholars have pointed to offshore jurisdictions as offering
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Because the prevailing view considers tax to be the only driver of
foreign incorporation, the existing literature is devoid of a serious inquiry
into the substantive corporate governance laws of foreign nations. While
appreciating insights from this current body of scholarship, this Article
analyzes the viability of foreign nations competing with Delaware from a
corporate governance perspective. This conversation is increasingly relevant
as foreign nations continue to grow their market share of “American”
corporations.
The following discussion documents recent domestic jurisprudence that
sets the stage for an international market for the supply of corporate law.
1. The Internal Affairs Doctrine Goes International
In the United States, a small state like Delaware can dominate the
corporate law market because of the widespread acceptance of the internal
affairs doctrine. 67 The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws
principle—a set of state law rules principally developed by judges in the
nineteenth century. 68 The doctrine enables corporations to opt into any state’s
corporate law simply by incorporating in that state. 69 Thus, the extent to
which foreign corporate law can successfully govern the “internal affairs” of
American companies—which in turn determines a range of issues including

innovative financial instruments. See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE:
MARKET DOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD 59–60 (2016)
(highlighting Bermuda’s success in the insurance industry); Anna Manasco Dionne & Jonathan R. Macey,
Offshore Finance and Onshore Markets: Racing to the Bottom, or Moving Toward Efficient?, in
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION 8, 8–10 (Andrew P. Morriss ed.,
2010). While this line of scholarship draws on the domestic corporate charter competition literature to
make normative claims about the desirability of offshore financial products, it does not recognize offshore
jurisdictions as competing with American states to supply corporate law for publicly traded corporations.
67 Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 161 (1985) (“To many corporate lawyers, the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine . . . is
irresistible if not logically inevitable.”).
68 See Tung, supra note 40, at 57–58. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the internal affairs
doctrine “is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.” Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
645 (1982). To conflict of laws junkies, the internal affairs doctrine is an unusual doctrine, departing from
the standard prescription that instructs courts to weigh multiple factors in order to determine the “correct”
law applicable to a dispute involving more than one jurisdiction. See LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT
OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 114–17, 177–85 (2015); Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the
Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 144 (2004) (“I believe the
internal affairs doctrine is open to serious challenge. I believe it is best seen as simply an exception to
conflict-of-laws rules . . . .”).
69 See Tung, supra note 40, at 45–46.
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derivative suits, fiduciary duties, and shareholder inspector rights 70—relies
not just on foreign nations offering desirable sets of corporate governance
rules, or even companies choosing to incorporate in those jurisdictions. It
relies on domestic law honoring those choices.
Today, the internal affairs doctrine has a near-impeccable pedigree
among judges in the United States. 71 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws, which has been highly influential in federal and state courts,72
prescribes the application of “local law of the state of incorporation” for
issues related to the internal affairs of corporations, except in unusual cases.73
However, one cannot assume that the internal affairs doctrine
automatically extends to corporations incorporated in foreign nations. First,
the Restatement specifically crafts guidelines for American “states,” 74
remaining silent on what judges ought to do in inter-national cases. Second,
the internal affairs doctrine is said to have a “quasi-constitutional” status, 75
operating under a few cryptic clues from the U.S. Supreme Court. 76 Given
70 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339, 339 (2018)
(“The internal affairs doctrine is the sine qua non of modern corporate law.”). Of course, whether a
particular matter falls under the domain of the “internal affairs” of a corporation is not entirely
straightforward. See James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law,
64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 131–32 (2017).
71 This need not be the rule, as a considerable number of foreign nations subscribe to the “real seat”
approach to corporate law, assigning corporate governance rules based on where the corporation
principally conducts its business. See Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of
Corporate Laws, 36 INT’L LAW. 1015, 1016 (2002) (“[T]he real seat doctrine . . . gives effect to the law
of the state that has the most significant relationship to a corporation.”).
72 Thus, for instance, in NatTel, LLC v. SAC Capital Advisors LLC, the Second Circuit referred to
the Connecticut choice of law rule that “the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating to
the internal affairs of a corporation,” while noting that the rule is “consistent with provisions in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.” 370 F. App’x 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2006).
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
74 See id. (referring to the “local law of the state of incorporation” (emphasis added)).
75 Compare Richard M. Buxbaum, Federalism and Company Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1163, 1166
(1984) (questioning the internal affairs doctrine’s constitutional pedigree), with Paul N. Cox, The
Constitutional “Dynamics” of the Internal Affairs Rule—A Comment on CTS Corporation, 13 J. CORP.
L. 317, 349 (1988) (“[T]he internal affairs rule of choice of law may have a constitutional dimension.”).
76 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1982) (“[I]n this case, MITE Corp., the tender
offeror, is a Delaware corporation with principal offices in Connecticut. Chicago Rivet is a publicly held
Illinois corporation with shareholders scattered around the country, 27% of whom live in Illinois. MITE’s
offer to Chicago Rivet’s shareholders, including those in Illinois, necessarily employed interstate facilities
in communicating its offer, which, if accepted, would result in transactions occurring across state
lines . . . . It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct restraint on interstate commerce and
that it has a sweeping extraterritorial effect.”). The Delaware Supreme Court has taken a step further,
pronouncing that the internal affairs doctrine may be constitutionally required “under due process, the
commerce clause and the full faith and credit clause—so that the law of one state governs the relationships
of a corporation to its stockholders, directors and officers in matters of internal corporate governance.”
McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216 (Del. 1987).
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that many of these constitutional doctrines have developed in a purely
domestic context or are plainly inapplicable for the international setting, 77 it
is unclear if constitutional law adds much guidance. It may be for this reason
that Judge Frank Easterbrook, one of the preeminent authorities in American
corporate law, pronounced in 2009 that “this country does not recognize an
internal-affairs doctrine in its dealings with other nations.” 78
Putting aside the question of whether courts ought to extend the internal
affairs doctrine internationally, a survey of domestic jurisprudential trends
reveals that courts across the United States have already extended the
internal affairs doctrine for American business entities incorporated in
foreign nations. Indeed, federal and state courts across jurisdictions,
including California, 79 Connecticut, 80 Delaware, 81 Illinois, 82 Maryland, 83
Minnesota, 84 New York, 85 New Jersey, 86 Texas, 87 and the District of

77 For example, the Full Faith and Credit Clause addresses the duties that states have to respect the
“public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis
added).
78 Easterbrook, Race for the Bottom, supra note 10, at 698.
79 See, e.g., Vaughn v. LJ Int’l, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 168 (Ct. App. 2009) (applying British
Virgin Islands law for “a fine jewelry company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, [which] has no
other connection to that jurisdiction”).
80 See, e.g., NatTel, LLC v. SAC Capital Advisors, 370 Fed. App’x 132, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying
Bahamas law for shareholder’s lawsuit involving an entity formed in the Bahamas).
81 See, e.g., Kostolany v. Davis, No. 13299, 1995 WL 662683, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1995)
(applying Dutch law after reasoning that legal relations between “a corporation and its stockholders,
directors, and officers are governed by the law of the state of incorporation”).
82 See, e.g., Pittway Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1996) (“On this issue of
internal corporate affairs, we look not to the law of any of the United States but to the law of France[,] a
State in the international sense.”).
83 See, e.g., Tomran, Inc. v. Passano, 891 A.2d 336, 342 (Md. 2006) (“[U]nder the internal affairs
doctrine, an analysis of Irish law determines whether Tomran possesses a right to bring a derivative
suit . . . .”).
84 See, e.g., Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 952 F. Supp. 2d 850, 855 (D. Minn. 2013) (“The Palm
Beach Funds were formed in the Cayman Islands and, hence, whatever duties they were owed must have
arisen under Cayman Islands law.”), aff’d, 764 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2014).
85 See, e.g., In re Kingate Mgmt. Ltd. Litig., No. 09-CV-5386 (DAB), 2016 WL 5339538, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2016) (“The fact that Madoff and his fraudulent scheme arose out of New York is
not sufficient to override BVI’s interests in regulating the relationship between BVI corporations and
their shareholders.”).
86 See, e.g., Krys v. Aaron, 106 F. Supp. 3d 472, 479 (D.N.J. 2015) (applying “Cayman law in
accordance with the internal affairs doctrine”).
87 See, e.g., In re BP S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 10-md-2185, 2011 WL 4345209, at *15 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 15, 2011) (“The primary concern of this derivative litigation is the internal affairs of an English
corporation, and the suit seeks to recover damages for the benefit of BP only. Accordingly, England has
a greater interest in the resolution of this dispute.” (emphasis omitted)).
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Columbia, 88 have recently extended the internal affairs doctrine for business
entities incorporated in foreign nations. 89
Courts frequently apply precedent developed in the interstate context
without distinguishing between states and foreign nations. For instance, in
Howe v. Bank of New York Mellon, the Southern District of New York
concluded that it “must apply Cayman Islands law to the question of
derivative standing” given that the defendant “is an entity incorporated under
the laws of the Cayman Islands.” 90 In other cases, courts have expressly held
that the internal affairs doctrine applies outside of the United States. For
instance, in City of Harper Woods Employees’ Retirement System v. Olver,
the D.C. Circuit applied English law to a company incorporated in England,
holding that the “internal affairs doctrine applies to corporations
incorporated outside of the United States.” 91
To be sure, this is not a universal rule. A number of federal and state
judges have declined to apply the internal affairs doctrine in international
cases on the grounds that there was an insufficient nexus between the
corporation’s physical operations and the place of incorporation. For
instance, in UBS Securities LLC v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., a
New York state trial court applied New York law in an internal affairs case
involving a Cayman Islands corporation because “[o]ther than being
incorporated in the Cayman Islands, [the corporation] has no obvious ties to
that jurisdiction.” 92 In another case, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District

88 See, e.g., City of Harper Woods Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 577 F. Supp. 2d 124, 129 (D.D.C. 2008)
(“The internal affairs doctrine is not limited to the application of the laws of the States of the United
States . . . . Based on the internal affairs doctrine, BAE plc, incorporated in the U.K., is subject to U.K.
law.”), aff’d, 589 F.3d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
89 Not all opinions automatically deduce applicable corporate law from the corporate entity’s place
of incorporation. In some cases, the place of incorporation is just one factor in a judge’s choice of law
analysis. For instance, noting that the internal affairs doctrine may be excused in “unusual cases,” a
federal judge in New Jersey in Krys v. Aaron employed New Jersey’s general choice of law analysis
weighing “(1) the interests of interstate comity, (2) the interests of the parties, (3) the interests underlying
the field of tort law, (4) the interests of judicial administration, and (5) the competing interests of the
states.” 106 F. Supp. 3d at 485. Even so, the court concluded that the law of the place of incorporation
(Cayman Islands law) controlled, in part because “the parties will necessarily benefit from the application
of a single standard.” Id.
90 783 F. Supp. 2d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
91 589 F.3d 1292, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
92 2011 WL 781481, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011), aff’d in part, modified in part, 940 N.Y.S.2d
74 (App. Div. 2012). But given that New York as a state has not adopted that policy (other New York
cases extend the doctrine internationally), this should be treated more like an exception. See, e.g., NatTel,
LLC v. SAC Capital Advisors, LLC, 370 F. App’x 132, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court
finding that “the law of the Bahamas—where ODC was incorporated—governed [the] dispute because
NatTel’s claims involved matters of internal corporate governance”).
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of New York refused to apply British Virgin Islands law for suits brought by
investors against British Virgin Islands hedge funds, reasoning in part that
the “allegedly tortious conduct . . . in relation to the management of the
Funds had little more than a nominal connection to the BVI.” 93 This line of
cases derives from the concept of “pseudo-foreign” corporations, or business
entities that have no physical presence in the state of incorporation other than
the fact of incorporation. 94
For better or worse, the “pseudo-foreign” corporations exception
surfaces from time to time in the domestic interstate context 95 without
detracting from the apparent robustness of the interstate charter competition
market. While judges may be more hesitant to extend the internal affairs
doctrine to corporations incorporated in foreign nations, 96 the doctrine has
been extended enough to enable foreign nations to effectively compete with
Delaware for corporate charters.
93

Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 446 F. Supp. 2d
163, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Tech. Dev. Co. v. Onischenko, No. 05-4282 (MLC), 2011 WL
6779552, at *11 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2011) (“We further note that the section 6 factors may not favor
application of Bermuda law, insofar as that jurisdiction has little connection to this claim with the
exception of TTDC being incorporated there and TTDC having a bank account there.”).
94 See Summer Kim, Corporate Long Arms, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1067, 1083–84 (2018) (“[The pseudoforeign corporation] exception provides that if a corporation is chartered in one place but does all of its
activities and business in another place (the host state), then the host state’s laws will apply to the internal
affairs of the corporation.”); Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 144–45
(1955). Even the Restatement of Conflict of Laws recognizes that there may be unusual cases where the
law of a state that is not the state of incorporation may govern, if that state has a more significant
relationship to the corporation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309 (AM. LAW
INST. 1971) (“The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the existence and
extent of a director’s or officer’s liability to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders, except where,
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship . . . .”); Kostolany
v. Davis, 1995 WL 662683, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1995) (explaining that the law of the state of
incorporation may not apply in an “extremely rare” situation where the “overriding interest of another
state” requires a contrary result).
95 Most noteworthily, California has enacted a statutory exception to the internal affairs doctrine,
mandating the application of California law for corporations that conduct the majority of their business
in California, without regard to the corporations’ place of incorporation. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115
(West 2010); see also Matt Stevens, Note, Internal Affairs Doctrine: California Versus Delaware in a
Fight for the Right to Regulate Foreign Corporations, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2007) (“The Internal
Affairs Doctrine (‘IAD’) has traditionally been a categorical rule mandating that in corporate conflict-oflaws scenarios, only the incorporating state has the right to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs.
California has created a statutory exception to the IAD, however, that allows regulation of the internal
affairs of out-of-state corporations in limited circumstances.”).
96 See, e.g., UBS Sec. LLC v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., No. 650097/2009, 2011 WL 781481,
at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011) (“Application of the law of New York is also mandated on the ground
that SOHC has almost no ties to the Cayman Islands. . . . Other than being incorporated in the Cayman
Islands, SOHC has no obvious ties to that jurisdiction.”), aff’d in part, modified in part, 940 N.Y.S.2d 74
(App. Div. 2012).

1422

114:1403 (2020)

Delaware’s New Competition

II. EVIDENCE OF MORE PLAYERS IN THE RACE: THE MAKING OF
OFFSHORE CORPORATE LAW HAVENS
This Part describes the extent to which foreign nations are starting to
compete with Delaware to supply corporate charters. Because of their
prominence in this general trend, this study primarily focuses on three
foreign nations that it refers to as “offshore corporate law havens”: Bermuda,
the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands. 97 The structure of this
Part is as follows. Section A presents data on corporations listed in American
securities markets that are increasingly opting to incorporate in foreign
nations—in particular, offshore corporate law havens. Section B explores the
structural design of offshore lawmaking processes. Unlike most American
states, but similar to Delaware, offshore corporate law havens are small
enough to make incorporation business a worthwhile venture for local
lawmakers. Indeed, lawmakers in these jurisdictions rely heavily on
incorporation fees, allowing them to credibly commit to maintaining
favorable corporate governance rules. 98 Section C explains how “local”
lawyers and other interest groups in key offshore jurisdictions benefit from
generating litigation and transactional work arising out of American
corporations incorporated locally. This Section also explains how private
law firms work closely with local lawmakers to swiftly enact corporate law
statutes. Section D documents the emergence of specialized business courts
in offshore jurisdictions that supply the judicial infrastructure necessary to
handle complex corporate law disputes.
A. The Rise of Offshore Corporate Law Havens
Any analysis discussing trends on where “American” corporations
choose to incorporate will inevitably confront definitional challenges
regarding what type of corporations qualify as “American” corporations. The
prevailing literature tends to use the term to describe corporations that are
publicly traded in American securities markets and incorporated in one of
97

It is worth reemphasizing that I focus on these three jurisdictions only to concretize the concept of
an international market for corporate law. This study should therefore not be taken to suggest that other
foreign nations besides these offshore jurisdictions do not or cannot attract publicly traded American
corporations. Indeed, the Marshall Islands and Ireland have also had some success attracting American
corporations.
98 This is because corporate charters are relational contracts. As Professor Romano explains, because
a charter “binds the state and firm in a multi-period relationship in which performance under the contract
is not simultaneous . . . a state needs a mechanism by which it can commit to firms that it will maintain
its code and otherwise not undo existing rules to firms’ disadvantage.” Roberta Romano, The States as a
Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209,
212 (2006) [hereinafter Romano, States as a Laboratory].
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the constituent states of the United States. 99 This approach does not account
for at least two types of corporations: (1) corporations that principally
operate within the territory of the United States but nevertheless choose
foreign nations as their place of incorporation; and (2) corporations that
principally operate outside the territory of the United States but may consider
shopping for U.S. corporate law when choosing to list in American securities
markets like the New York Stock Exchange. The semantic debate over what
should count as an “American” corporation falls outside the scope of this
paper. Instead, this Article investigates whether corporations with a
substantial American factual nexus—corporations that operate physically in
the United States or corporations that raise capital by listing in American
securities markets—shop for corporate law produced by foreign nations.
Specifically, I surveyed all publicly traded corporations listed in
American securities markets, principally made up of corporations listed in
the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. 100 Using Standard &
Poor’s Compustat database, a compilation of public financial data for
publicly traded corporations, I gathered more than thirty years of all publicly
available data from 1985 to 2018. 101 As shown in Table 1, over 14% of firms
trading on American securities markets are now incorporated in foreign
nations. This represents a substantial growth from 1985, when only 2.7% of
entities were incorporated in foreign nations. While Delaware continues to
dominate the market, foreign nations now account for more than triple the
number of companies incorporated in Nevada, which has been identified as
99 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality,
or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 348 (2006) (“Our initial sample consists of all public
new issues of common stock between 1990 and 2002 by companies headquartered and incorporated in
one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia contained in the SDC database.”); Peter Dodd & Richard
Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation,
53 J. BUS. 259, 261–62 (1980) (studying the proportion of firms incorporated in Delaware out of the total
number of companies incorporated in the United States); id. at 263–64 (studying New York Stock
Exchange-listed firms that reincorporated from one American state to another American state).
100 Data are on file with author. NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange are the two biggest
securities markets in the United States. Other securities markets included in the study are companies listed
in the American Stock Exchange, OTC Bulletin Board, Boston Stock Exchange, Midwest Exchange,
Pacific Exchange, and Philadelphia Exchange.
101 A few details on the methodology of data collection are worth mentioning. I aggregated the data
using Wharton Research Data Services’ Compustat. This aggregated dataset consisted of a large number
of duplicate inputs. I filtered out the duplicates using the statistics software SPSS. Because Compustat
includes firms listed in both Canadian and American securities markets, I used SPSS to filter out
“Canadian” firms (for instance, firms that are only listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange are excluded).
Because OTC includes both American and Canadian firms, I also excluded those firms listed in OTC that
trade in Canadian currency. I also went through firms that did not have currency information manually to
exclude Canadian firms. Using SPSS, I also disaggregated the data by jurisdiction of incorporation (coded
“fic” for foreign nations and “loc” for constituent states of the United States).
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the only other state besides Delaware actively vying to draw corporations
that physically operate outside of its borders. 102
TABLE 1: INCORPORATION DECISIONS OF PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS LISTED IN
AMERICAN SECURITIES MARKETS
1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2016

2017

2018

Delaware

42.4%

47.4%

49.2%

48.1%

47.6%

47.1%

48.5%

48.7%

48.3%

49.2%

Nevada

2.5%

2.5%

2.5%

4.9%

5.3%

6.6%

5.8%

5.2%

4.8%

4.3%

Foreign
Nations

2.7%

4.2%

6.6%

9.7%

11.7%

12.2%

13.6%

14.4%

15.1%

14.9%

Several caveats warrant attention. Most notably, a significant part of the
increase in foreign incorporation may be attributable to the changing
demographics of firms trading in American securities markets. 103 More
specifically, it may be an indication of growth in the number of companies
principally headquartered in foreign nations that are raising capital in
American securities markets. For instance, Toyota Motors is a Japanese
automobile manufacturer headquartered in Tokyo, but made its debut in the
New York Stock Exchange in 1999. 104 There are certainly increases
attributable to these types of firms. These corporations typically use the
corporate law of their “home” nation, appearing not to shop for corporate
law. 105

102

See Barzuza, supra note 29, at 940.
It is worth noting here that it is difficult (if not impossible) to compute the percentage of firms
incorporated in foreign nations that are physically headquartered in the United States merely by collecting
data on the firms’ stated headquarters reported to the SEC. This is because the SEC has not defined the
“principal place of business,” and it is common for firms to abuse this shortcoming. See Where Is Your
CORP.
&
SEC.
L.
BLOG,
Corporation’s
Principal
Executive
Office?,
CAL.
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/where-is-your-corporation-s-principal-80235/
[https://perma.cc/6HMW-G4JX] (“The Securities and Exchange Commission, however, has not defined
‘principal executive offices’ for purposes of Form 10-K.”). It is also relatively easy to manipulate the
firms’ stated headquarters in certain industries. See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12,
at 12–15. Thus, this study relies on various indirect metrics to measure the growing market share captured
by foreign nations.
104 Financial Information & Stock Price, TOYOTA, https://www.toyota.com/usa/investors/index.html
[https://perma.cc/AH9Y-AFXL].
105 Thus, for instance, Toyota Motors is incorporated in Japan and governed by Japanese corporate
law, despite being listed on the New York Stock Exchange. See Toyota Motor Corp., Annual Report
103
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But a sizable portion of the expanded share is attributable to firms that
principally operate in the United States. As shown in Table 2, about a quarter
of firms incorporated in foreign nations are accounted for by three
jurisdictions that this Article has identified as “offshore corporate law
havens”: the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands. This
figure is important because the vast majority of corporations formed in these
jurisdictions, which are widely known to draw clients from the United
States, 106 do not actually conduct their operations in those jurisdictions. 107
Typically, these corporations physically operate in “onshore” jurisdictions
like the United States and have no connection to offshore jurisdictions other
than the fact of incorporation—essentially glorified paperwork. 108 This is the
case even when corporations claim to have their headquarters in offshore
jurisdictions. Consider, for instance, Theravance Biopharma, a company
incorporated in the Cayman Islands. The company declares a P.O. Box in
George Town, Cayman Islands, as its headquarters in its SEC filings. 109 But
even a cursory examination of the company’s disclosed real estate holdings
in the same filings indicates that its physical headquarters are located in
South San Francisco, California. 110
While still a small portion of the overall market, there is a clear trend in
terms of the increase of market share captured by offshore corporate law
havens.

(Form 20-F) 131–32 (June 25, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094517/
000119312518201591/d549954d20f.htm [https://perma.cc/33QF-ZSZD].
106 See, e.g., SIEMENS, supra note 14, at 9. To be clear, these jurisdictions do not exclusively cater to
firms based in the United States. For instance, firms based in China that are listed in NASDAQ or the
New York Stock Exchange are frequently incorporated in the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin
Islands. See William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness 5, 16 (Oct. 30, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). Bermuda, however, appears to heavily cater to firms physically
headquartered in the United States. According to my survey of SEC disclosures looking at real property
ownership and revenue source data, for instance, approximately 40% to 50% of all publicly traded
Bermuda companies listed in the United States today appear to be actually headquartered in the United
States, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of these firms claim that they are headquartered in
Bermuda. William J. Moon, Appendix 1: “Bermuda” Corporations Listed in American Securities Markets
(on file with author).
107 See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12, at 9.
108 See William J. Moon, Tax Havens as Producers of Corporate Law, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1081,
1095 (2018) [hereinafter Moon, Tax Havens]. This shows that a sizable portion of the increase is
attributable to firms that shop for the corporate law. See Barzuza, supra note 29, at 948 n.33.
109 See, e.g., Theravance Biopharma, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2017).
110 See id. at 56 (“Our principal physical properties in the US consist of approximately 170,000
square feet of office and laboratory space leased in two buildings in South San Francisco, California. The
lease was extended in November 2017 and expires in May 2030.”).
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TABLE 2: FOREIGN CORPORATIONS INCORPORATED IN OFFSHORE CORPORATE LAW HAVENS

Bermuda

Cayman
Islands

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2016

2017

2018

5.1%

5.8%

8.2%

6.6%

7.5%

6.9%

6.3%

6.3%

5.8%

5.8%

2.3%

3.0%

2.5%

2.8%

7.9%

15.4%

13.9%

15.6%

18.5%

18.5%

0.6%

1.8%

2.1%

2.6%

2.5%

4.1%

4.3%

4.8%

4.7%

4.5%

8.0%

10.6%

12.8%

12.0%

17.9%

26.4%

24.5%

26.7%

29.0%

28.8%

British
Virgin
Islands
Total

To be sure, whether corporations incorporate in foreign nations for
corporate law or for some other reason, like tax reduction, is difficult to test.
But the prevailing account that attributes everything to tax incentives breaks
down under deeper consideration.
For one, there are dozens of “tax havens” that offer 0% corporate and
capital gains tax. 111 Yet, corporations traded on American securities markets
like the New York Stock Exchange tend to cluster around only a handful of
jurisdictions, 112 suggesting that there is something more than tax motivating
their behavior. Second, far from offering archaic corporate governance rules,
offshore corporate law havens frequently update their corporate law
statutes—largely in response to private sector demand. For instance, the
Cayman Islands has updated its Companies Law at least fifty-eight times
since originally enacted in 1964. 113 Official government publications do not
111 According to one notable study, there are “roughly 40 major tax havens in the world today.”
Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens?, 93 J. PUB. ECON.
1058, 1058 (2009).
112 See supra Table 1 and Table 2.
113 See CONYERS DILL & PEARMAN, CAYMAN ISLANDS COMPANIES LAW 1–2 (2018),
https://www.conyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Cayman_Companies_Law_Conyers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A8EW-37XN]. The frequency of updates is not unusual for leading offshore
jurisdictions. Bermuda, for instance, has amended or updated its corporate law at least forty-five times.
See CONYERS, DILL & PEARMAN, BERMUDA COMPANIES ACT 1981 AND RELATED LEGISLATION 3–4
(2018),
https://www.conyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/
Bermuda_Companies_Act_1981_Conyers.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CAZ-J33W].
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shy away from pronouncing the factors motivating amendments to their
corporate law statutes. For instance, the Cayman Islands government
describes the purpose of legal updates as improving “the competitiveness
and attractiveness of companies incorporated in the jurisdiction.” 114 Indeed,
if offshore jurisdictions were just about tax reduction, they might simply try
to copy and paste Delaware’s General Corporation Law. But, as elaborated
in Part III, offshore corporate law havens have opted to differentiate their
corporate law from that of Delaware. Third, even after several federal
legislation and administrative orders in the United States aimed at curbing
tax avoidance, many corporations have remained incorporated in foreign
nations. 115 This may be due to path dependency, but it could also be driven
by attractive corporate governance rules offered in foreign jurisdictions.
Incorporation decisions of American firms following the new federal
tax bill provide a particularly important datapoint. The Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017, 116 which includes a provision designed to reduce the incentive
for transnational corporate tax arbitrage, 117 does not appear to have slowed
down offshore incorporation. Connecticut-based Biohaven Pharmaceuticals,
New Jersey-based Watford Holdings, Massachusetts-based Kiniksa
Pharmaceuticals, New York-based Replay Acquisition Corporation, and
New Jersey-based Hudson Group are a few recent examples of corporations
listed on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ that chose to
incorporate offshore, instead of in Delaware, to go public. 118 Publicly
available SEC filings indicate that the companies choosing to incorporate in

114 CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, PLAN AND ESTIMATES FOR THE 2018 FINANCIAL YEAR & FOR THE 2019
FINANCIAL
YEAR
26
(2017),
http://www.gov.ky/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/12612394.PDF
[https://perma.cc/VM67-ZKX3] [hereinafter CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, PLAN & ESTIMATES].
115 See, e.g., Talley, supra note 12, at 1748–51.
116 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
117 See David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under
the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1488 (2019) (“[T]he old system of U.S. international
tax rules, prior to the new tax legislation, was also the subject of considerable tax gaming and inefficiency.
As measured against the baseline of old law, some of the new rules represent modest improvements.”);
Susan C. Morse, International Cooperation and the 2017 Tax Act, 128 YALE L.J. F. 362, 380 (2018)
(assessing that the new tax bill’s base erosion and anti-abuse tax “should function as an anti-tax haven
measure”); Jonathan D. Rockoff & Nina Trentmann, New Tax Law Haunts Companies That Did
‘Inversion’ Deals, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 11, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-taxlaw-haunts-companies-that-did-inversion-deals-1518350401 [https://perma.cc/QC37-9832].
118 See Biohaven Pharm. Holding Co., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 10 (Dec. 12, 2018) (Virgin Is.);
Watford Holdings, Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B3) 236 (Mar. 26, 2019) (Berm.); Kiniksa Pharm., Ltd.,
Prospectus (Form 424B4) 7 (May 23, 2018) (Berm.); Replay Acquisition Corp., Prospectus (Form
424B4) 1 (Apr. 3, 2019) (Cayman Is.); Hudson Grp., Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B1) 10 (Jan. 31, 2018)
(Berm.).
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foreign nations are well-counseled about the content of offshore corporate
law—presumably indicating that they are making informed decisions. 119
B. “Captured” Lawmakers: Offshore Governments Rely Heavily on
Incorporation Fees
Of course, the proposition that offshore governments even produce laws
accommodating private sector preferences cannot be taken for granted. At
least in theory, the government revenue generated from firms incorporated
offshore ought to be significant enough from the local lawmakers’ point of
view to make the venture worthwhile.120 This Section thus examines the
extent to which offshore lawmakers are reliant on incorporation-related
revenue—namely, franchise tax and incorporation fees—as a rough metric
of understanding legislative behavior.
Revenue data, assembled from official government publications of the
British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands, help to assess
whether lawmakers in these jurisdictions are indeed reliant on fees from
locally incorporated firms. 121 These data appear to back up anecdotal
accounts that these lawmakers—lacking a source of significant revenue
besides tourism—rely heavily on incorporation fees. 122 As shown in Tables
3 through 5, this reliance is not uniformly strong across these jurisdictions.
In recent years, the British Virgin Islands, for example, has derived over half
of its government revenue from incorporation-related fees. Bermuda, on the
other hand, derived 6.3% to 7.1% of its revenues from annual incorporation
fees. To put these numbers in perspective, Delaware’s incorporation fee
revenues, which are often heralded as the textbook case of legislative

119

See infra Section III.A.
See Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 687–88.
121 Several notes on the limitation of the data presented here are worth mentioning. First, exact yearto-year comparison is not possible, because both Bermuda and the Cayman Islands report revenue figures
from mid-year to mid-year. Second, these jurisdictions do not supply revenue data broken down by type
of business entity. Therefore, the numbers include fees derived from both closely held and publicly traded
business entities, although the data exclude fees from “funds” or “banking,” where possible. Even if a
significant proportion of their revenues are derived from closely held business entities, the fact that
offshore corporate law havens regularly update their corporate law statutes makes it likely that they derive
a significant percentage of their revenue from publicly traded corporations.
122 Ezra Fieser, Indebted Caribbean Tax Havens Look to Tax Foreign Investors, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1126/IndebtedCaribbean-tax-havens-look-to-tax-foreign-investors [https://perma.cc/2PNJ-MD49] (“[I]ndustry analysts
and tax specialists believe new fees and taxes will bring in needed money for government coffers while
doing little harm to the business community.”).
120
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dependence on corporate charter fees, averaged 17% of the state’s total tax
revenue over the past several decades. 123
TABLE 3: BERMUDA REVENUE SOURCE (IN BERMUDIAN DOLLARS) 124

2014–2015
2015–2016
2016–2017

“Fees, Permits &
Licenses” from
“International
Companies”
$62.78 million
$60.82 million
$62.61 million

Total Government
Revenue

Percentage of
Government
Revenue

$880.41 million
$935.43 million
$987.99 million

7.13%
6.50%
6.34%

TABLE 4: THE BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS REVENUE SOURCE (IN U.S. DOLLARS) 125

2015
2016
2017

Taxes Related to
“Registry of Corporate
Affairs”
$171.16 million
$164.94 million
$170.04 million

Total Government
Revenue
$314.70 million
$307.06 million
$290.98 million

Percentage of
Government
Revenue
54.39%
53.71%
58.43%

123 Romano, States as a Laboratory, supra note 98, at 212–13 (“This financial dependency on
incorporation fees makes Delaware highly responsive to the requirements of corporations for an updated
legal regime; it cannot afford to lose domestic corporations from being slow to update its code. Because
it would lose a major revenue source if the number of domestic incorporations markedly declined,
Delaware is a hostage to its own success, which makes credible a commitment to corporate law
responsiveness.”).
124 GOV’T
OF
BERM.,
2016–2017
BUDGET
STATEMENT
40
(2016),
https://www.gov.bm/sites/default/files/2016-2017-Budget-Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H29-SY7S]
(2014–2015 revenue data and 2015–2016 revenue data); GOV’T OF BERM., 2018–2019 BUDGET
STATEMENT 33 (2018), https://www.gov.bm/sites/default/files/2018-Budget-Statement_Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UG5Y-ZQYV] (2016–2017 revenue data).
125 GOV’T
OF
THE
VIRGIN
IS.,
2018
BUDGET
ESTIMATES
7–9
(2018),
http://www.bvi.gov.vg/pub/2018%20Budget%20Estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UQN-57HT] (2016–
2017 revenue data) [hereinafter BVI BUDGET 2018]; GOV’T OF THE VIRGIN IS., 2017 BUDGET ESTIMATES
8–10 (2017), http://www.bvi.gov.vg/pub/2017%20Budget%20Estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NF9PXAQ] (2015 revenue data).
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TABLE 5: THE CAYMAN ISLANDS REVENUE SOURCE (IN CAYMAN ISLANDS DOLLARS) 126
“Company Fees” from
Exempt, Foreign, and
Nonresident
Companies

Total Government
Revenue

Percentage of
Government
Revenue

2014–2015

$98.49 million

$891.07 million

11.05%

2015–2016

$99.86 million

$712.42 million

14.02%

2016–2017
(estimate)

$79.85 million

$623.21 million

12.81%

These data are crucial for several reasons. Primarily, heavy reliance on
incorporation fees makes offshore lawmakers highly sensitive to private
sector preferences on corporate governance rules. 127 Relatedly, this reliance
lends credibility to lawmakers’ responsiveness to private sector demand in
the face of evolving market conditions. 128
This analysis also helps demystify a degree of perplexity about the
motivations driving offshore jurisdiction competition to attract foreign
companies. Professor Talley, for instance, has observed that the objectives
of offshore tax havens appear to “have little to do with tax earnings
maximization,” 129 suggesting that these jurisdictions potentially “crave
international fame and prominence that comes with a high market share of
incorporations” 130 or share some sort of “commitments on taxes.” 131 Offshore
corporate law havens, however, do not typically levy corporate taxes or taxes
imposed on income derived from local activities for foreign corporations
incorporated locally. These data instead suggest that the motives of offshore

126

CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, PLAN & ESTIMATES, supra note 114, at 332, 405 (2015–2016 revenue data
and 2016–2017 data estimate); CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, PLAN & ESTIMATES FOR THE 18-MONTH PERIOD
ENDING
31
DECEMBER
2017,
at
365,
386
(2013),
http://www.gov.ky/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/12310534.PDF [https://perma.cc/ZY7C-SAMZ] (2014–2015
revenue data).
127 The governments in these jurisdictions are acutely aware of the competition from other foreign
nations. See, e.g., BVI BUDGET 2018, supra note 125, at ix (“There are jurisdictions competing to take
on our market share in financial services . . . if and where we fall short.”).
128 See ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at 38 (“[A] state with a large proportion of its budget
financed by the franchise tax will be responsive to firms, since it has so much to lose.”).
129 Talley, supra note 12, at 1716.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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corporate law havens are not too different than those of Delaware.132 And,
like Delaware, offshore corporate law havens rely on the profits from
recurring franchise and incorporation fees received from locally registered
business entities. 133 This reliance sets the stage for offshore lawmakers to be
“captured” by the private sector in their production of corporate law.
C. The Role of Lawyers and Other “Local” Interest Groups
To focus exclusively on government coffers to explain the behavior of
legislators would neglect another pivotal aspect of corporate lawmaking
process—the various interest groups, including lawyers, accountants, and
other stakeholders who stand to benefit from attracting foreign corporations,
that also drive the corporate lawmaking process in offshore corporate law
havens, just as they do in the domestic context. 134 Accounting for these
interest groups refines the crude theory of legislative behavior that
presupposes revenue maximization as the objective of domestic and offshore
governments. 135
Studying Delaware, Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller
laid the theoretical foundation for an interest group approach to studying

132

See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12, at 10–11. The lack of corporate tax thus
accounts for Professor Talley’s assessment, as well as that of critics of “tax havens” who characterize
these jurisdictions as parasitic entities that enable corporations to evade or avoid domestic tax. See also
Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 108, at 1081–82.
133 Consistent with others who have observed that market-dominant jurisdictions are able to
command higher annual franchise tax, offshore corporate law havens appear to be able to charge high
annual franchise fees. It is well-established that Delaware exploits its market-dominant position in the
incorporation market to price discriminate. As Professors Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar explain,
“Delaware uses its uniquely structured franchise tax to charge a higher incorporation price to public
corporations than it does to nonpublic corporations, and that among public corporations, it charges a
higher price to larger corporations than it does to smaller ones.” Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price
Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1209 (2001) [hereinafter
Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination]. Similar traits are found in offshore corporate law havens. In
Bermuda, for instance, annual fees start at $2,095 and increase on a sliding scale up to $32,676—
calculated according to issued share capital. See WALKERS, CLIENT MEMO: GLOBAL – COMPARISON OF
COMPANIES – CAYMAN ISLANDS, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, BERMUDA, JERSEY, GUERNSEY AND
IRELAND
3
(2019),
https://www.walkersglobal.com/images/Publications/Memo/Global/
Global_Comparison_of_Companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FPS-DH69].
134 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1511
(1989) (“Not all states are motivated solely by the goal of maximizing franchise-tax revenues. Many
states are at least weakly motivated by the goal of maximizing the revenues of the local corporate bar . . . .
Furthermore, legislatures are not private sellers, but public actors. Attracting the business of principals
by making side payments to agents is a morally dubious enterprise. For some legislators, public morality
will be an important constraint on the willingness to engage in that enterprise. The extent of that
willingness also undoubtedly varies from state to state.”).
135 See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 37, at 228.
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American corporate law. 136 Their account revealed that attracting corporate
charters not only benefits the state legislature that accrues franchise taxes
annually, but also various interest groups that benefit from the spillover
effects of drawing incorporation business. 137 Professors Macey and Miller
concluded that Delaware’s preeminent corporate law regime principally
serves to benefit “Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the
state.” 138
In the international context, evaluating offshore corporate law havens
within an interest group framework also reveals the inner workings of these
jurisdictions. Generally, the ability of local lawmakers to raise a sizable
portion of their budget from incorporation fees, principally from foreign
sources, allows offshore corporate law havens to lower taxes on domestic
constituents. 139 However, certain local constituencies, or special interest
groups, tend to benefit more than others. Special beneficiaries include local
residents that provide services to locally incorporated corporations, from
registered agents to property owners leasing small offices or mailboxes, to
foreign business entities. 140 A number of locals also explicitly benefit from
laws that increase the value of their residency status. For instance, under
Bermuda law, at least one director, secretary, or representative of a
corporation must be a resident of Bermuda. 141 Local residents routinely serve

136

See Macey & Miller, supra note 43.
Others have extended this framework, building an impressive catalog of law review articles
devoted to studying Delaware using an interest group framework. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson,
Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV.
85 (1990).
138 Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 472. This account has been highly influential, although scholars
assign different persuasive value as to its explanatory power. See, e.g., ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2,
at 30 (“Although I am skeptical of the strong form of Macey and Miller’s claim that Delaware’s
corporation code favors lawyers over shareholders, Delaware’s commanding position in the charter
market may possibly enable the corporate bar to siphon a share of Delaware’s monopoly rents by
generating some laws that decrease firm value and increase attorney income.”).
139 This is strictly from the point of view of that jurisdiction. From the international community’s
standpoint, welfare effects are mixed at best. See Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 108, at 1094 (“When
accounting for tax incentives, the fact that consumers of corporate law have not advocated a replacement
of the current system, which is often taken as the best evidence of the welfare-enhancing effects of
jurisdictional competition, cannot be assumed.” (citation omitted)).
140 To be sure, whether the distribution of benefits is completely lopsided within these jurisdictions
depends on the level of public services that the governments in these jurisdictions provide to their citizens
and how these are distributed. This is because presumably the level of local public service would be lower
without franchise revenues. I am grateful to Professor Romano for this point.
141 Bermuda Companies Act of 1981, § 130(1) (Berm.); Natalie Town & Jonathan Betts, Corporate
Governance and Directors’ Duties in Bermuda: Overview, THOMPSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (2015),
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I2030ee541cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.htm
137
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as “dummy” directors for hundreds, if not thousands, of companies, playing
little or no actual role in the entities’ operations. 142 Foreign corporations thus
help create jobs in the local economy. Lawyers, unsurprisingly, benefit from
the structure of offshore incorporations as well. In Delaware, the bulk of the
financial gains go to corporate transactional lawyers and litigators, as
evidenced by the fact that Delaware lawyers have the highest average income
in the country. 143 The corporate lawyers that benefit offshore, fascinatingly,
are not entirely “local.” They are principally made up of an elite cadre of
lawyers who work in “offshore magic circle” law firms—a colloquial term
given to law firms that have established physical offices in strategic offshore
jurisdictions like Jersey, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong,
and the Seychelles. 144 A significant fraction of the lawyers who practice law
in these jurisdictions are foreign citizens who move offshore and are
accredited to practice locally. In addition to warm weather and sandy
beaches, these jurisdictions offer minimal income tax rates to attract foreign
talent. 145 These offshore law firms typically work with larger international
l?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1. [https://perma.cc/TFY7JNCQ].
142 The same is true for many closely held business entities. To form feeder funds in the Cayman
Islands, managers must hire directors who are physically present in the territory of the Cayman Islands.
These directors, who serve as directors in hundreds—if not thousands—of entities, typically play little or
no role in the management of the fund—explaining why they typically do not exist in domestic hedge
funds. See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12, at 50. As Professor John Morley explains,
the so-called “dummy directors” exist in offshore jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands “typically because
quirks of law in offshore jurisdictions require it.” John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers:
A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1253 (2014) [hereinafter
Morley, Investment Fund].
143 Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 695. According to the influential public choice theory,
lawyers in Delaware financially benefit from the steady stream of shareholder litigation (and related
business law disputes) brought involving Delaware corporations. See Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home
of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1136–37 (2005) (“[T]he . . .
sophisticated body of corporate law in Delaware comes with a heavy price, extracted by powerful interest
groups within the state, particularly lawyers, who enjoy the dominant position within the culture that
generates corporate law rules.”).
144 An example of a successful “offshore magic circle” law firm is Appleby. The firm, which gained
international notoriety in 2017 from massive document leaks that made international headlines as the
Paradise Papers, has offices in Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Hong
Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Shanghai. About Us, APPLEBY,
https://www.applebyglobal.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/FB7R-L8FQ].
145 As a Financial Times spread explains, offshore law firms actively recruit foreign lawyers who
are “drawn by the sun, low income tax rates and the prospect of becoming a partner faster.” Madison
Marriage & Barney Thompson, ‘Offshore Magic Circle’ Law Firms Fear Paradise Papers Fallout, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/8aff482c-c4a3-11e7-b2bb-322b2cb39656
[https://perma.cc/4AWF-SMJ4]. Unsurprisingly, specialized recruitment firms have emerged, recruiting
lawyers from the United States by promising low tax rates, warm weather, and proximity to the United
States. See HAMILTON RECRUITMENT, LIVING & WORKING OFFSHORE: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS 2,
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law firms to draw clients from the United States and the United Kingdom,146
although some New York “Big Law” firms have recently entered alone to
get a share of this booming business. 147
Of course, there is nothing inherently pernicious about lawyers getting
rich. Indeed, a crucial ingredient in Delaware’s corporate law regime is the
legislature’s responsiveness to local interest groups. 148 In Delaware, there is
an “unwritten compact between the bar and the state legislature,” wherein
Delaware lawmakers regularly “call upon the expertise of the Corporation
Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association to recommend, review and
draft almost all amendments to the statute.” 149 The lawmaking process in
offshore corporate law havens is not too different from Delaware, although
fewer lawyers control the lawmaking process. In virtually all these
incorporation havens, the process of proposing and drafting corporate
legislation is controlled by as few as one or two firms. 150 This process is far
from a secret. It is not unusual for law firms to advertise their close working

http://www.hamilton-recruitment.com/HR_Downloads/OffshoreGuideForLawyers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7BB-HN9S] (“Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands share the
characteristics of low tax, a common law legal system, the benefits of a Caribbean-style climate and
proximity to the United States.”).
146 See Marriage & Thompson, supra note 145 (“Large international law firms in New York and
London, many of which work with offshore companies to help their clients structure their investments,
have warned staff against discussing the Paradise Papers publicly. DLA Piper, which was itself hit by a
cyber-attack this year, sent a memo to staff on Tuesday, seen by the Financial Times, warning them
against publicly commenting on the documents, as several of its clients were affected by the leak.”).
147 See,
e.g., Press Release, Sidley, Sidley Advises on Successful US $3.8
Billion Restructuring of Ocean Rig UDW (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.sidley.com/en/newslanding/
newsannouncements/2017/09/sidley-advises-on-successful-us-3-8-billion-restructuring-of-ocean-rigudw [https://perma.cc/R2QY-7A7G] (“Sidley represented Simon Appell of AlixPartners and Eleanor
Fisher of Kalo . . . . The restructuring was implemented through four separate and interconnected Cayman
Islands-law governed schemes of arrangement . . . .”); see also Scott Flaherty, What It Takes to Dominate
in the Elite Game of International Litigation, AM. LAW. (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://kobrekim.com/assets/Uploads/What-It-Takes-to-Dominate-in-the-Elite-Game-of-InternationalLitigation-The-American-Lawyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3R2-U8Y7] (“Kobre & Kim has lawyers
stationed in offshore jurisdictions like the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands—something that
can come in handy if, say, a client needs a lawyer in Hong Kong but is going up against a BVI-registered
company . . . .”).
148 Romano, Corporate Law Redux, supra note 29, at 363 (calling Delaware’s corporate bar the
“catalyst” when corporate codes are updated).
149 LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 4 (2007). This group consists of
twenty-one transactional and litigation attorneys representing small and large law firms in Wilmington,
Delaware. See Hamermesh, supra note 31, at 1755–56; see also Romano, Corporate Law Redux, supra
note 29, at 364 (explaining that the powerful corporate bar “monitors and identifies needed legislative
changes . . . and the Delaware legislature in turn responds to the bar’s pulling the fire alarm by enacting
the proposed initiatives”).
150 Briant, supra note 35, at 63.
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relationships with offshore legislatures to their clients. 151 According to a
report commissioned by the British Virgin Islands government, the country’s
financial services law is a byproduct of “regular meetings with the private
sector,” which includes the Bankers Association and the Financial Services
Advisory Committee. 152 Indeed, the legendary legislation that gave birth to
an offshore financial services market in the British Virgin Islands was
introduced by a Shearman & Sterling lawyer from New York. 153 This process
of public–private partnership ensures that the laws on the books stay up-todate and reflect private sector preferences.154 In the British Virgin Islands,
for instance, a group of prominent private sector lawyers serving on the
Financial Services Commission provide specific input relating to
amendments on the British Virgin Islands’ Companies Act (BVI’s corporate
law statute). 155 For example, as recently as June 2018, the Commission
advised the cabinet of the British Virgin Islands to revise the Companies Act
by lowering penalties for corporate noncompliance. 156
Legislative committees in the Cayman Islands similarly illustrate how
the private sector dictates the content of corporate law. The Cayman Islands
Constitution formally recognizes the Attorney General as the chief legal
151

See John Christensen, Do They Do Evil? The Moral Economy of Tax Professionals, in
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE MORAL ECONOMY OF FRAUD 72, 80 (David Whyte & Jörg Wiegratz eds.,
2016) (“Appleby Partners have been members of the elected legislatures, and ministers in governments
in a number of offshore financial centres.” (footnote omitted)).
152 LAWS CONSOL., INC., CONSULTANT’S REPORT FOR BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS: COMPUTERISATION
ADMINISTRATION
OF
JUSTICE
3–4
(1998),
AND
THE
http://lawsconsolidated.com/cms3/phocadownload/Reports/British%20Virgin%20Islands%20Report.pd
f [https://perma.cc/4FAM-GHRA].
153 See Colin Riegels, British Virgin Islands: A Tough Act to Follow, MONDAQ (July 20, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/327334/offshore+financial+centres/A+Tough+Act+To+Follow
[https://perma.cc/GD7S-5YDU] (describing how the International Business Companies Act in the British
Virgin Islands was drafted by “a Wall Street lawyer named Paul Butler from renowned New York law
firm Shearman & Sterling”).
154 See, e.g., Government Boards and Committees, GOV’T BERM., https://www.gov.bm/governmentboards-and-committees [https://perma.cc/GQS8-K9SD].
155 See THE VIRGIN IS. FIN. SERVS. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 43 (2014),
http://www.bvifsc.vg/sites/default/files/annual_report_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6LJM-NXB8]
(explaining how the commission helps draft bills, regulations, and other subsidiary legislation); see also
Governance, VIRGIN IS. FIN. SERVS. COMMISSION, http://www.bvifsc.vg/about-us/governance/board-ofcommissioners [https://perma.cc/SAJ8-4ASY] (providing the names and biographies of the
Commission’s membership). Michael Riegels, a founding partner of the offshore law firm Harneys and
one of the original drafters of the BVI Companies Act, was selected as the first chairman of the board.
See Press Release, Virgin Is. Fin. Servs. Comm’n, British Virgin Islands Financial Services Commission
Board
Appoints
an
Additional
External
Commissioner
(June
12,
2012),
http://www.bvifsc.vg/news/british-virgin-islands-financial-services-commission-board-appointsadditional-external [https://perma.cc/Q57T-6WT3]; Riegels, supra note 153.
156 See Business Companies Act (Amendment of Schedule 1) (No. 2) Order, 2018 (Virgin Is.).
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adviser to the Legislative Assembly. 157 The Attorney General delegates this
authority to several subcommittees to allow leading offshore lawyers to draft
actual legislation. The former managing partner of a prominent offshore law
firm, Maples and Calder, described the process bluntly: “[T]he private sector
[identifies] areas of particular need and tak[es] a first cut at drafting the
legislation to meet it. The private sector will always be best placed to
undertake that role because of its relations with onshore professionals who
can pinpoint precisely what needs to be drafted to achieve the effect they
seek.” 158
The private sector not only helps draft laws, but also helps corporate
clients navigate local administrative requirements. Local law firms typically
bundle and sell corporate law “packages” that satisfy all local administrative
requirements, ranging from appointing resident directors to maintaining
corporate books in the territory of the incorporating jurisdiction. 159
All in all, prominent private sector lawyers are instrumental in writing
the content of corporate governance rules in leading offshore jurisdictions,
exerting influence as de facto lawmakers.
D. The Rise of Offshore Business Courts
Despite their arguably favorable corporate governance regimes,
offshore corporate law havens may still lack the judicial infrastructure
necessary to compete with Delaware. While any given jurisdiction can copy
and paste laws from Delaware, it is difficult to transplant Delaware’s
renowned judicial system. This is the principal explanation offered to explain
why other states like Maryland have not been successful at competing with
Delaware. The advantages offered by Delaware include: (1) the Delaware
Chancery Court, where judges who have corporate law expertise resolve

157 Portfolio of Legal Affairs, CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, http://www.gov.ky/portal/page/portal/plghome/
what-we-do [https://perma.cc/H9KR-YEZS].
158 Charles Jennings, The Financial Services Legislative Committee, CAYMAN FIN. REV. MAG. (Aug.
3,
2011),
https://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2011/08/03/the-financial-services-legislativecommittee/ [https://perma.cc/F72F-K3QW].
159 One leading law firm in Bermuda, for instance, arranges for the following services under a
standard agreement: “i) Bermuda resident directors (if required); ii) Company secretary (to maintain the
corporate records of the client company); iii) Maintaining the minute book, share register and register of
directors & officers; iv) Providing registered office facilities for the client company; v) Liaising with
government departments with respect to annual filings and any changes to the constitutional documents
of the company; vi) Liaising with banks and other service providers such as accountants and auditors.”
ATTRIDE-STIRLING & WOLONIECKI, INCORPORATION OF AN EXEMPTED COMPANY IN BERMUDA 6–7
(2008), http://www.aswlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Incorporation-of-an-ExemptedCompany-in-Bermuda.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ3X-BNC8].
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disputes without juries; 160 (2) the meritocratic nature of selecting Chancery
Court judges; 161 and (3) the steady production of case law that reduces
uncertainty in the application of substantive law. 162 These advantages amount
to an unusually high barrier to entry that make it difficult for other states to
compete. 163 Although other states are aware of Delaware’s lucrative revenue
stream, 164 few have attempted to give a run for Delaware’s money, and even
fewer have actually succeeded. 165
That assumption does not hold true for small foreign nations. In the past
decade or two, offshore corporate law havens have launched specialized
business courts aimed at resolving complex commercial disputes: the
Bermuda Commercial Court (2006), the Commercial Division of High Court
in the British Virgin Islands (2009), and the Financial Services Division of
the Cayman Islands Grand Court (2009). 166 These specialized business courts
were built specifically to resolve disputes that arise from foreign firms
incorporated locally, typically separated from the garden variety of local
civil and criminal matters. For instance, in the Cayman Islands, all actions
under Part XVII of the Companies Act (Cayman’s corporate law statute) are
required to be brought in the Financial Services Division. 167 Moreover, like
160 Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 708; see also Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 590 (1990) (“Delaware’s governor,
mindful of the value of corporate charters, often deliberately appoints judges with corporate expertise.”);
Mark J. Roe, Juries and the Political Economy of Legal Origin, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 294, 294 (2007)
[hereinafter Roe, Juries] (“[T]he usual view in legal circles is that the jury’s absence (and the resulting
decision-making by expert judges, not juries), is a strength of the court, not a weakness.”).
161 Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 708 (stating that a nominating commission chooses
Chancery Court judges).
162 See id. (explaining that Delaware’s widely published case law provides guidance to practitioners).
163 See id. (“One would expect states trying to attract incorporations to establish similar courts. But
none has.” (citation omitted)).
164 In recent decades, Delaware has earned approximately “$440 million per year in franchise taxes
and related fees.” Fisch, Peculiar Role, supra note 23, at 1061.
165 See John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915,
1920 (2012) (stating that other states have not replicated unique aspects of Delaware courts, including
their focus on corporate law and lack of juries); Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 724–36.
166 TIM PRUDHOE & ALEXANDER W. HEYLIN, KOBRE & KIM, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS (2018),
https://kobrekim.com/assets/Uploads/PDFs/Getting-the-Deal-Through-Asset-Recovery-2018-BritishVirgin-Islands-2.PDF?url=/assets/Uploads/Getting-the-Deal-Through-Asset-Recovery-2018-BritishVirgin-Islands-2.PDF [https://perma.cc/B56P-P4MA]; Bermuda’s Commercial Court: The First Five
GAZETTE
(Mar.
2,
2012,
8:12
AM),
Years,
ROYAL
http://www.royalgazette.com/article/20120302/BUSINESS/703029943 [https://perma.cc/2R27-ZAR4];
Alan Markoff, Cayman’s Judiciary Grows with the Times, CAYMAN FIN. REV. (Jan. 5, 2011),
https://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2011/01/05/caymans-judiciary-grows-with-the-times/
[https://perma.cc/N7GH-4RVH].
167 Sam Dawson & Peter Sherwood, Litigation and Enforcement in the Cayman Islands: Overview,
THOMPSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (2019), https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-633-8594 (last
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Delaware, offshore corporate law havens have uniformly eliminated jury
trials for corporate law disputes, 168 allowing cases to be resolved relatively
swiftly and predictably.
Reminiscent of judges on the Delaware Court of Chancery, offshore
corporate law havens are staffed by judges with business law expertise who
are commissioned on a merit-based system. 169 But there are important
differences. Unlike Delaware’s Chancery Court judges, who are required to
be “Delaware citizens,” 170 offshore judges in many circumstances are foreign
citizens. Consider the Financial Services Division of the Grand Court in the
Cayman Islands. Of the six judges in the Financial Services Division, only
one judge is a Cayman Islands citizen. 171 One of the Financial Division

visited Apr. 12, 2020). The British Virgin Islands screens for these cases by requiring that “[t]he minimum
value for a claim to be brought in the Commercial Court is US$500,000, although most cases are
considerably larger than that.” See Supreme Court (High Court), GOV’T VIRGIN IS.,
http://www.bvi.gov.vg/supreme-court-high-court [https://perma.cc/VC57-HVB6]. Finally, claims arising
out of the Bermuda Companies Act are required to be resolved by the Bermuda Commercial Court. See
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1985, Order 72/1 (Berm.), http://www.bermudalaws.bm/laws/
Consolidated%20Laws/Rules%20of%20the%20Supreme%20Court%201985.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SA58-P9YY].
168 APPLEBY, GUIDE TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 4 (2015),
https://www.applebyglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/guide-to-the-legal-system-of-the-caymanislands.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JBV-J6T4] (“Civil cases before the Grand Court, by contrast, are often
heard by judge alone unless the matter is one which can be heard by judge and jury (e.g. in cases of
defamation).”); David Kessaram et al., Bermuda, in LITIGATION & DISPUTE RESOLUTION 24, 24 (Ted
Greeno ed., 6th ed. 2017), https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/litigation-and-disputeresolution-laws-and-regulations [https://perma.cc/246H-35WB] (“The judges in the Commercial Court
are experienced in commercial matters and decide cases without a jury.”); Roe, Juries, supra note 160, at
294 (“America’s premier corporate court—the Delaware Chancery court—sits without a jury . . . .”);
Andrew Thorp et al., British Virgin Islands, in COMPLEX COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 19, 26 (Simon
Bushnell
&
Daniel
Spendlove
eds.,
2019)
(available
by
subscription),
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/102/jurisdiction/128/complex-commercial-litigation-britishvirgin-islands/ [https://perma.cc/5T6Q-YEQ9] (“Jury trials are not the norm and there is no provision for
this mode of trial in the Commercial Court procedural rules. The BVI Commercial Court appoints single
judges to perform the function of both tribunal of fact and law when determining the issues at trial.”).
169 See, e.g., Guy Manning et al., Cayman Islands, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2017, at 48 (Martin
Davies
&
Kavan
Bakhda
eds.,
2017)
(available
by
subscription),
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/9/jurisdiction/59/dispute-resolution-cayman-islands/
[https://perma.cc/2RDM-DKA6] (“[T]he selection process takes the form of a significant application
form, shortlisting and interview.”). While commercial courts in offshore jurisdictions tend to be called
“divisions” within courts that handle garden variety of criminal and civil cases, commercial cases are
funneled into specialized divisions with judges with business law expertise, effectively constituting
separate court systems.
170 Judicial
Officers,
DEL.
CTS.,
https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7YYS-A6D8\].
171 Judges, CAYMAN IS. JUD. ADMIN., https://www.judicial.ky/judicial-administration/judges
[https://perma.cc/N8CF-KKFX]; Margaret Ramsay-Hale Gets Top Judge Job in TCI, CAYMAN NEWS
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judges in the Cayman Islands was also a partner in the London office of the
renowned international law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP
(Freshfields) and is now a barrister at a barristers’ chambers in London. 172
Another recently appointed judge in the same court is a former solicitor and
partner at Freshfields and current associate at a barristers’ chambers located
in London. 173 In Bermuda, the Chief Justice has recently appointed nine
“assistant justices,” a group of experienced commercial lawyers, who sit on
the commercial court on an as-needed basis. 174
Although many court opinions are publicly available, and precedents
do help contribute to filling gaps left in statutory language, offshore
jurisdictions come nowhere close to the case law maintained by Delaware. 175
In contrast to Delaware’s judicial system, these jurisdictions also do not have
every opinion available to the public. Of the three offshore jurisdictions, the
Cayman Islands is most secretive. According to a recent report, 55% of cases
litigated at the Financial Services Division of the Cayman Islands were
sealed over a sixty-eight-day period. 176 While unsealed opinions are
published either in the Cayman Islands Law Reports or on the Cayman
SERV. (June 20, 2014), http://archive.caymannewsservice.com/2014/06/20/margaret-ramsay-hale-getstop-judge-job-in-tci/ [https://perma.cc/KXP4-P45M].
172 See Nick Segal, ERSKINE CHAMBERS, https://www.erskinechambers.com/barrister/nick-segal/
[https://perma.cc/8624-65KE].
173 Raj
Parker,
MATRIX
CHAMBERS,
https://www.matrixlawinternational.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Raj-Parker-CV.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G5N-JN89]; Raj Parker CV, CT.
INNOVATIVE ARB., coia.org/CV-Raj-Parker.PDF [https://perma.cc/3XGE-7GVX]. In the Cayman
Islands, the judiciary also solicits applications for “part-time” judges for the Financial Division, who work
an average of fifteen to twenty days per month. See Application for Acting Grant Court Judges, CAYMAN
IS. GOV’T (2017), http://www.judicialandlegalservicescommission.ky/upimages/ckeditor/AD_GCJFSD_January%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PN5-ECGS].
174 Most “assistant justices” are also fellows at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. GOV’T OF
BERM., ASSISTANT JUSTICES’ PANEL-CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.gov.bm/sites/default/files/ASSISTANT%20JUSTICES%20PANEL.PDF
[https://perma.cc/UL2A-TGUA].
175 It is worth emphasizing that the secrecy element is not completely different from Delaware. In
Delaware, although opinions are public, important rulings or insights into future rulings are made from
the bench during trial and motion practice. See Mohsen Manesh, Dictum in Alternative Entity
Jurisprudence and the Expansion of Judicial Power in Delaware, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 336, 350 (Robert W.
Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015) (“Transcript opinions, like dictum and the bench’s
professional and scholarly engagement, have provided Delaware’s judges with alternative means by
which to mold and refine the law, beyond the holdings of their written opinions.”). Although hearing
transcripts are not public, law firms typically purchase them and use them as quasi-precedents. My thanks
to Professor Romano for this point.
176 David Marchant, Cayman Court Secrecy on the Rise: 55% of Recent Financial Cases Are Sealed,
OFFSHORE ALERT (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.offshorealert.com/secrecy-at-financial-services-divisiongrand-court-of-cayman-islands.aspx [https://perma.cc/DE6X-U6AV].
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Islands Judicial Administration’s website, full and unlimited access to the
Cayman Islands Law Reports is available only to registered users who pay
an annual fee. 177 In Bermuda, the official government website publishes
judicial opinions of commercial disputes, but many cases are adjudicated
confidentially and not subject to public disclosure. 178 Some British Virgin
Islands opinions are available for a subscription fee, 179 but the general rule is
that in the British Virgin Islands, restricted access to court documents other
than public summaries is not unusual. 180
The quasi-public nature of offshore judicial proceedings, which look a
lot like modern commercial arbitration, 181 helps these jurisdictions compete
in the global corporate law market. Consider commercial cases resolved by
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), two of the leading arbitration houses in the world. These
arbitration houses resolve high-stakes commercial disputes through the
consent of litigants. 182 In 2017 alone, over one thousand cases were filed with
the international division of the AAA. 183 While some of the cases resolved in
177 See
Cayman
Islands
Law
Reports,
CAYMAN
IS.
JUD.
ADMIN.,
https://www.judicial.ky/judgments/cayman-islands-law-reports [https://perma.cc/93UL-SYCH]. In the
Cayman Islands, proceedings are generally held either in open court or in the judge’s chambers. Most
large commercial cases are held in open court, but some proceedings take place in the judge’s chambers,
which are “generally considered to be private to the parties to the proceedings.” Dawson & Sherwood,
supra note 167.
178 See
Court
Judgments,
GOV’T
BERM.,
https://www.gov.bm/court-judgments
[https://perma.cc/C8ZZ-CQLZ]; Karen Skiffington, Finding the Law in Bermuda, GLOBALEX (Oct.
2010), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Bermuda.html [https://perma.cc/9YLH-F852].
179 See The Largest Collection of Caribbean Case Law, JUSTIS, https://www.justis.com/caribbean/
[https://perma.cc/5CQD-R9AN].
180 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed while adjudicating a claim that the
“secret” nature of the British Virgin Islands proceedings is against U.S. public policy, “restricted access
to court documents [other than public summaries] is not unusual in the BVI . . . because only certain
limited records are typically available to non-parties.” In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 714 F.3d 127, 140 (2d
Cir. 2013).
181 These features are not unique to offshore business courts. Professor Matthew Erie, for instance,
documents the emergence of dispute resolution centers in Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Dubai, and
Kazakhstan that are designed to “hook capital by attracting cross-border commercial disputes through a
number of business models.” See Matthew S. Erie, The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of
International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 21)
(on file with author).
182 MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 2 (3d ed. 2017) (“The parties’ consent provides the underpinning for the power of the
arbitrators to decide the dispute.”).
183 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 20 (2018).
Within these cases, the largest claimants stemmed from a diverse group of industries including
“technology, commercial insurance, energy, aviation/aerospace/national security, pharmaceuticals,
financial services and commercial construction.” Id.
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arbitration end up getting published, albeit with significant retractions, 184
many of the cases remain unpublished. 185 This feature helps, rather than
impedes, arbitration houses compete with domestic courts as modern dispute
resolution hubs. 186
Moreover, Delaware’s widely known advantages do not fully guard
against competition from foreign nations because not every jurisdiction
necessarily benefits from copying Delaware’s judicial system. Recall that
Delaware’s corporate law “relies on open-ended standards applied by judges
in ways that are highly case-specific.” 187 This indeterminacy (1) enables
Delaware to price discriminate annual incorporation fees; 188 (2) increases
demand for litigation, thus benefiting local corporate lawyers; 189 and (3)
deters potential competition from other states.190
184 See generally, e.g., 7 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS,
2012–2015 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Yves Derains & Dominique Hascher eds., 2018); AAA YEARBOOK
ON ARBITRATION & THE LAW xxiii (Stephen K. Huber & Ben H. Sheppard, Jr. eds., 25th ed. 2013); Award
Made in Case No. 1512 (ICC 1971), reprinted in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS, 1974–1985,
at 3 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains eds., 1990).
185 Arbitral Awards & Court Decisions, GEO. L. LIBR., http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/
c.php?g=363504&p=2455950 [https://perma.cc/WR5V-S35K] (“Locating a decision or award issued by
an arbitral tribunal in an international commercial dispute is often an exercise in frustration. Many
decisions and awards are not published . . . and some that are published have the names of the parties
redacted.”).
186 See Ware, supra note 25, at 704–06 (discussing the extent to which the creation of law has been
privatized through arbitration); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the
ANALYSIS
1,
1
(2002),
https://object.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa433.pdf
Charge,
POL’Y
[https://perma.cc/U4GC-YN4G] (“Arbitration is a private-sector alternative to the government court
system. Compared with litigation, arbitration is typically quick, inexpensive, and confidential.”).
187 Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk, supra note 52, at 601; see also William T. Allen, Ambiguity
in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 900 (1997); Fisch, Peculiar Role, supra note 23, at 1074
(“Delaware corporate law relies on judicial lawmaking to a greater extent than other states.”). As
Professor Rock explains, “the fact-specific, narrative quality of Delaware [judicial] opinions, over
time . . . yield reasonably determinative guidelines.” Rock, Saints and Sinners, supra note 23, at 1017.
188 See Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 133, at 1208. This is because Delaware’s
vague corporate code induces the state to be a “litigation intensive” corporate law regime, generating a
large body of case law. Firms and their shareholders are willing to pay more to opt into this legal regime.
According to Professors Kahan and Kamar, “since Delaware offers by far the largest body of corporate
law precedents, its law is more predictable than those of other states.” Id. at 1235.
189 See Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 498 (“If the state were acting as a pure profit maximizer,
it would attempt to minimize the indirect costs and maximize the direct costs of Delaware
incorporation.”).
190 See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 56 (2005) (“[J]udges may craft opinions to limit the risk of corporate
migration . . . . [A]lthough a few reincorporations out of state do not represent a serious threat to the
authority of the Delaware judiciary, large scale corporate migration poses a direct threat to Delaware
courts as national corporate lawmakers. The judiciary therefore has a direct incentive to avoid opinions
that would unleash a flood of corporate migration.”); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of
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While Delaware counts on a large number of corporate litigants to
reduce uncertainty associated with its vague statutory rules, foreign nations
have enacted relatively clear-cut statutory laws. 191 Far from being a death
knell for competing in the market for corporate law, relatively clear statutory
language may be attractive for certain firms that do not benefit from building
extensive case law in a particular jurisdiction. Furthermore, a lack of an
American-style discovery system and procedure may be attractive, at least
for certain segments of the market, for the same reason certain consumers of
Delaware corporate law are looking to resolve disputes in private arbitration
rather than going to the Delaware Court of Chancery. 192

III. INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR CORPORATE LAW AND THE FUTURE
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
This Part assesses the extent to which offshore corporate law havens
offer differentiated corporate law “products” from American states and
evaluates the normative desirability of the increasingly globalized market for
corporate law. Section A documents offshore corporate law havens’
corporate governance rules that enable corporations to opt out of mandatory
rules imposed by Delaware corporate law. Section B examines whether
international corporate charter competition may be desirable from the
perspective of society at large. While giving credence to the possibility that
jurisdictional competition can benefit firms—and collectively, society at
large—this Part identifies two countervailing considerations salient in the
international context that render any claims about gains from jurisdictional
competition premature at best.
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1911 (1998) (discussing the “competitive
advantage” Delaware derives from network externalities).
191 Several competing theories might help explain this phenomenon. One reason why Delaware has
gotten away with vague statutory laws is that it faces weak competition from other states. See Kahan &
Kamar, Myth, supra note 28. Another plausible explanation is that foreign nations, unlike Delaware, do
not fear the federalization of American corporate law and are thus able to devise corporate law statutes
without intervention from Washington, D.C. As Professors Bebchuk and Hamdani explain, “[T]he
flexibility of the open-ended standards enables Delaware case law to develop in directions that are
responsive to the fear of federal intervention without the visible change in course that would be involved
in a legislative amendment.” Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk, supra note 52, at 603.
192 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Delaware’s Fall: The Arbitration Bylaws Scenario, in CAN DELAWARE
BE DETHRONED? 35, 50 (Stephen Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018) (commenting on the potential emergence
of arbitration in corporate charters that force shareholders to arbitration); Zachary D. Clopton & Verity
Winship, A Cooperative Federalism Approach to Shareholder Arbitration, 128 YALE L.J. F. 169, 170–
71 (2018) (“The consequences of a shift to shareholder arbitration could be substantial . . . . A shift to
arbitration likely would dramatically reduce the number of claims filed, in part because representative
actions such as class actions or derivative suits probably would be unavailable. The future of shareholder
rights may be at stake.” (footnote omitted)).
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A. Lax Laws Offshore?
American corporate law is predominantly conceptualized as default
rules that firms can opt out of through contract. 193 But there are a few
mandatory rules under state corporate law that even sophisticated parties
cannot waive through contract. 194 These rules principally govern the power
structure between shareholders and managers of corporations. 195
Importantly, a survey of key corporate governance rules offered by
leading foreign jurisdictions reveals distinctive templates of corporate codes
that allow corporations to opt out of rules that are mandatory in the pure
domestic context. 196 These include (1) limitations on shareholder derivative
lawsuits; (2) restrictions on shareholders inspecting books and records of
corporations; and (3) lax fiduciary duty rules that allow corporations to opt
out of rules that are mandatory in the United States.197 These features are
highlighted below.

193 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 2 (“The corporate code in almost every state is an
‘enabling’ statute. An enabling statute allows managers and investors to write their own tickets, to
establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a regulator.”); Jens Dammann, The
Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining American Exceptionalism in Corporate Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 441,
441 (2014) (“Corporate law in the United States is largely enabling, whereas most other countries around
the globe rely heavily on mandatory corporate law.”).
194 See Christopher M. Bruner, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K.
Business Entities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 285, 289 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew
S. Gold eds., 2018).
195 See Jens Dammann, Homogeneity Effects in Corporate Law, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1103, 1134 (2014)
(“[M]any of the norms that govern the distribution of power between shareholders and the board of a
public corporation retain their mandatory character.”).
196 I want to be clear here that not all offshore jurisdictions pursue the strategy of offering
differentiated corporate governance rules. Corporate law of the Marshall Islands, for instance, is largely
modeled after Delaware corporate law. The Marshall Islands Business Corporations Act specifically
instructs that the law be “applied and construed to make the laws of the Republic . . . uniform with the
laws of the State of Delaware.” 52 M.I.R.C., Part I, § 13 (2004) (Marsh. Is.).
197 These rules are illustrative and not exhaustive. For instance, offshore corporate law also enables
domestic corporations to opt out of shareholder appraisal rights, which is guaranteed in every state in the
United States. Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 34 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 543, 543 (2018) (“In mergers and acquisitions law, shareholders of a target company often
enjoy a statutory right to reject the terms of an approved sale in favor of a judicial determination of ‘fair
value’ for their shares. All states provide dissenters with some form of appraisal right . . . .”). Some
offshore companies are upfront about the lack of minority shareholder protection. Houston-based Vantage
Drilling Company, for instance, discloses in its SEC filing the effect of its status as a Cayman Islands
company: If “a takeover offer . . . is approved, any dissenting shareholder would have no rights
comparable to appraisal rights, which would otherwise ordinarily be available to dissenting shareholders
of United States corporations, providing rights to receive payment in cash for the judicially determined
value of the shares.” Vantage Drilling Company, Registration of Certain Classes of Securities (Form 8A/A) 6 (Jan. 14, 2010).
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1. Derivative Suits
Derivative suits, which date back to the early nineteenth century in the
United States, 198 are typically shareholder claims against corporate insiders
for mismanagement. 199 These claims have long been available under every
American state’s corporate law. 200 Under Delaware law, a shareholder is
eligible to bring a derivative action if she demands the board of directors to
assert the claims or offers particular reasons why making such a demand
would be futile. 201 Successful derivative suits are paid to the corporation,
theoretically enhancing the value of the stock and assets of the corporation
for all current shareholders. 202 While the desirability of a liberal derivative
suit regime is disputed—after all, defending frivolous suits is costly 203—the
general availability of derivative suits purportedly serves to compensate
injured shareholders while deterring managerial misconduct. 204
Offshore corporate law havens have vastly restricted the possibility of
derivative suits. 205 In the British Virgin Islands, shareholders must first seek
permission from the court prior to bringing a derivative suit. 206 Even if the
court grants their request, 207 the remedy may require the company to acquire
the shareholders’ shares. 208 In the Cayman Islands, derivative suits similarly
require permission from the court to proceed, and the practical success rate
is slim. As practitioners from one prominent law firm explain, “[n]ot only is
198 The earliest shareholder suit in the United States was brought in 1832. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT,
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (2018) (citing Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige
Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832)).
199 See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem, 100 VA. L.
REV. 261, 268 (2014).
200 See Erickson, supra note 30, at 122.
201 See Dennis J. Block, Stephen A. Radin & Michael J. Maimone, Derivative Litigation: Current
Law Versus the American Law Institute, 48 BUS. LAW. 1443, 1451 (1992); John H. Matheson, Restoring
the Promise of the Shareholder Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV. 327, 359–60 (2016).
202 See Geis, supra note 199, at 268–71.
203 See Erickson, supra note 30, at 86; Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and
Corporate Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5–6 (1999).
204 Swanson, supra note 30, at 1345–46.
205 Of course, only time will tell if these jurisdictions will continue to maintain rules that are hostile
to derivative suits.
206 Statutory provisions on derivative actions have been enacted in the BVI Business Companies Act,
2004, §§ 184C–184F (Virgin Is.).
207 The British Virgin Islands law enumerates the list of factors judges must consider in deciding
whether to grant a leave: “(a) whether the member is acting in good faith; (b) whether the derivative
action is in the interests of the company taking account of the views of the company’s directors on
commercial matters; (c) whether the proceedings are likely to succeed; (d) the costs of the proceedings in
relation to the relief likely to be obtained; and (e) whether an alternative remedy to the derivative claim
is available.” BVI Business Companies Act, 2004, § 184C (Virgin Is.).
208 Id. § 184I.
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the threshold for such claims quite high (including the requirement to prove
self-dealing or wrongful benefit), but the likely remedies available may be
limited[.] [F]or example there is no ability to recover damages for mere
negligence, or to claw back preferential or fraudulently undervalued
transfers.” 209 While Bermuda did not previously have a statutory framework
on derivative suits, it amended its rules in 2018 to require derivative suits to
seek leave from the court, thereby bringing its rules close to those of the
Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. 210
Some corporations are upfront about the content of offshore corporate
laws in their public disclosures. For example, New York fashion house
Michael Kors, which incorporated in the British Virgin Islands before listing
in the New York Stock Exchange in 2011, disclosed in its annual reports:
“The laws of the British Virgin Islands provide limited protection for
minority shareholders, so minority shareholders will have limited or no
recourse if they are dissatisfied with the conduct of our affairs.” 211 Likewise,
the public disclosures of Herbalife, which is headquartered in Los Angeles
and incorporated in the Cayman Islands, explain: “Our Cayman Islands
counsel, Maples and Calder, is not aware of any reported decisions in relation
to a derivative action brought in a Cayman Islands court.” 212 Incorporation
choices of these “offshore” companies have serious consequences for
American investors. In several cases, federal and state judges have dismissed
multibillion-dollar suits brought by domestic shareholders of American
firms incorporated in offshore jurisdictions, despite plaintiffs bringing the
cases in the United States. 213
2. Inspection of Corporate Books and Records
Derived from common law, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
currently require corporations to provide shareholders qualified access to
corporate books and records by statute. 214 This right, which is one of the few

209 MOURANT, BREACH OF DUTY BY DIRECTOR OF A CAYMAN FUND – THE PATH TO INVESTOR
RELIEF IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS VS NEW YORK 4 (2017), https://www.mourant.com/file-library/media–
–2016/2016-guides/breach-of-duty-by-director-of-a-cayman-fund.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VUY-22MM].
210 Bermuda RSC Amended to Require Leave to Bring Derivative Actions, APPLEBY (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.applebyglobal.com/publications/bermuda-rsc-amended-to-require-leave-to-bringderivative-actions/ [https://perma.cc/ESM7-QAD6].
211 Michael Kors Holdings Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-3) 8 (Feb. 19, 2013).
212 Herbalife Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 41–42 (Feb. 19, 2013).
213 See, e.g., Winn v. Schafer, 499 F. Supp. 2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing a derivative
suit brought by a shareholder of a reinsurance company incorporated in the Cayman Islands).
214 Browning Jeffries, Shareholder Access to Corporate Books and Records: The Abrogation
Debate, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2011).
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rights bestowed on individual shareholders, 215 is deemed critical because of
the basic agency problem that arises in large corporations: managers who run
the corporations have better information than dispersed shareholders who
technically own the corporations. 216 Under Delaware law, shareholder
requests for inspections are granted when there is a “proper purpose.” 217
Delaware courts have zealously guarded this right. 218 Thus, for instance, in a
recent case, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a proper purpose for
inspection may include “possible derivative litigation” or even seeking “an
audience with the board to discuss reforms or, failing in that, they may
prepare a stockholder resolution for the next annual meeting, or mount a
proxy fight to elect new directors.” 219
Books and records inspections are uniformly forbidden under the laws
of offshore corporate law havens. An SEC disclosure of a multinational solar
power producer incorporated in the Cayman Islands best captures the state
of Cayman Islands law:
Shareholders of Cayman Islands exempted companies such as ourselves have
no general rights under Cayman Islands law to inspect corporate records and
accounts or to obtain copies of lists of shareholders of these companies . . . .
This may make it more difficult for you to obtain the information needed to
establish any facts necessary for a shareholder motion or to solicit proxies from
other shareholders in connection with a proxy contest. 220

215 See Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and
Collective Rights, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1042 & n.6 (2002).
216 Books and records inspections can thus aid potential investigations for corporate wrongdoing,
help mount a proxy fight, or assist in preparing a stockholder resolution. See Samuel L. Moultrie &
Andrea Schoch Brooks, Delaware Insider: Defining a Proper Purpose for Books and Records Actions in
Delaware, 2015 BUS. L. TODAY 1 (2015); F. Hodge O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders:
Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121, 139 (1987).
217 See, e.g., Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Abbvie Inc., 2015 WL 1753033, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15,
2015).
218 Thus, according to a recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion, “[i]t is well established that
investigation of potential corporate wrongdoing is a proper purpose for a Section 220 books and records
inspection.” Id.
219 Graulich v. Dell Inc., 2011 WL 1843813, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 16, 2011).
220 Sky Solar Holdings, Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 34 (May 2, 2016); see also Vantage
Drilling Co., Registration of Certain Classes of Securities (Form 8-A/A) 7 (Jan. 14, 2010) (“Holders of
the Ordinary Shares will have no general right under Cayman Islands law to inspect or obtain copies of
the Company’s list of shareholders or its corporate records (other than the Amended and Restated
Memorandum and Articles of Association).”).
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The British Virgin Islands and Bermuda similarly allow corporations to
forbid their shareholders to inspect books and records, either outright or
through various procedural hurdles. 221
3. Fiduciary Duties of Directors and Officers
Among the most canonical mandatory rules in American corporate law
include the fiduciary duty owed by directors and officers (agents) to
shareholders (principal). These duties are unsurprising, given that dispersed
shareholders need a mechanism to ensure that people who operate their
companies do not abuse their powers. Fiduciary duties can be largely divided
into two duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care
imposes liability if directors exercise business judgment without first being
adequately informed, while the duty of loyalty prohibits directors from
improperly benefiting through conflicts of interest. 222 Despite loosening
monetary exposures on duty of care personal liability of directors, 223
Delaware mandates this duty upon officers—like chief executive officers—
who operate the corporation on a daily basis. Furthermore, a Delaware
corporation cannot waive “any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders” for “acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law” or “any
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.” 224
By incorporating in one of the leading offshore jurisdictions, domestic
corporations can opt out of fiduciary duties that have long been considered
axiomatic features of American corporate law. Here, we see diverging
approaches among offshore jurisdictions. Whereas the Cayman Islands and
221 Joshua Mangeot, British Virgin Islands: Shareholder Activism – Considerations for BVI
2017), http://www.mondaq.com/x/615488/Shareholders/
Companies, MONDAQ (July 31,
Shareholder+Activism+Considerations+For+BVI+Companies
[https://perma.cc/98XT-DUJA]
(“[S]ubject to the company’s M&As, the directors [of a BVI corporation] may refuse or limit access if
they are satisfied that inspection would be contrary to the company’s interests. While it is possible to
apply to court to seek access in such cases, this is a relatively costly process and the court may be reluctant
to make an order permitting inspection provided the directors can evidence bona fide commercial
justifications for restricting access.”); Everest Re Grp., Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 36 (2017)
(“Bermuda law does not provide a general right for shareholders to inspect or obtain copies of any other
corporate records.”).
222 Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1084–85 (2017).
223 See Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 675, 696 (2009) (explaining that under Delaware law, firms can contractually “exculpate their
directors from monetary damage liability for a breach of the duty of care”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2019) (specifying that corporations incorporated in Delaware may include a
provision “eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders
for monetary damages” for duty of care violations).
224 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
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the British Virgin Islands appear to have adopted similar mandatory rules as
Delaware, 225 Bermuda stands unique in allowing corporations to waive all
fiduciary duty claims against directors and officers except in events of fraud
or dishonesty. 226 Indeed, as an SEC disclosure form of a biopharmaceutical
company incorporated in Bermuda makes clear: “as permitted by Bermuda
law, each shareholder has waived any claim or right of action against our
directors or officers for any action taken by directors or officers in the
performance of their duties, except for actions involving fraud or
dishonesty.” 227
These waivers would not be enforceable under Delaware law. While
Delaware has recently enacted a revision to its statute that has narrowed the
scope of its fiduciary duty laws, 228 the duty of loyalty still affords several
ways shareholders can bring fiduciary suits to hold officers and directors
accountable. As explained in the famous Delaware Supreme Court decision
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, these suits are available
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the
intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally
fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties. 229

*

*

*

Taken together, restrictions on shareholder derivative suits,
prohibitions on shareholders’ books and records inspections, and loosened
fiduciary duties may be an indication that managers are attempting to draw
225 See APPLEBY, GUIDE TO DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 5–6 (2015) [hereinafter
APPLEBY, GUIDE]; WALKERS, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS – DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS OF
BVI COMPANIES 3–4 (2016).
226 Bermuda Companies Act of 1981, § 98(1)–(2) (Berm.) (“[A] company may in its [bylaws] or in
any contract or arrangement between the company and any officer, or any person employed by the
company as auditor, exempt such officer or person from, or indemnify him in respect of, any loss arising
or liability attaching to him by virtue of any rule of law in respect of any negligence, default, breach of
duty or breach of trust of which the officer or person may be guilty in relation to the company or any
subsidiary thereof . . . . Any provision . . . exempting such officer or person from, or indemnifying him
against any liability which by virtue of any rule of law would otherwise attach to him in respect of any
fraud or dishonesty of which he may be guilty in relation to the company shall be void . . . .”).
227 Axovant Scis. Ltd., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 44 (June 30, 2015).
228 Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 222, at 1077–78 (describing Delaware corporate law allowing
the waiver of rules that forbid “corporate fiduciaries from appropriating new business prospects for
themselves without first offering them to the company”).
229 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
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rent at the expense of shareholders. This is the traditional race for the bottom
story. But lax rules are not inconsistent with a race for the top story. A
benevolent explanation may be that the lack of mandatory rules benefits both
managers and shareholders by deterring frivolous lawsuits. After all, modern
shareholders of publicly traded corporations include sophisticated
institutional investors like BlackRock or The Vanguard Group 230 that
presumably would choose not to invest in firms incorporated in foreign
nations if they could not sufficiently protect their self-interest. The next
Section fleshes out the normative dimensions of this new descriptive reality.
B. Implications: Reassessing the Market for Corporate Law
The foregoing analysis yields several new insights that make the
international market for corporate law an area for future research. 231 My goal
in this Section is to resist the temptation to draw sweeping normative
conclusions and instead to offer some preliminary assessments that may
prescribe a research agenda for the next several decades. Thus, I will
highlight areas where the globalizing market for corporate law forces us to
rethink prevailing assumptions and methods.
To begin, the emergence of an international market for corporate law
may improve the robustness of competition between jurisdictions to supply
230

See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST
WEAPON 84 (2018); Scott Hirst, The Case for Investor Ordering, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 227, 241–42
(2018) (“[T]he nature of corporate investment has been transformed by the rise of institutional investors.
Retirement savings have shifted to the equity markets, and from direct investment to investment
intermediated by institutional investors. The great majority of U.S. corporations now have most of their
outstanding shares held by institutional investors.” (citations omitted)); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991) (documenting
and analyzing the rise of institutional ownership of publicly traded American corporations).
231 One area ripe for future research is to model the type of domestic companies that are incorporating
in foreign nations. Following Professor Barzuza’s important work documenting the rise of Nevada as a
“liability-free” jurisdiction, scholars have produced empirical evidence that Nevada principally attracts
small firms. In an important study, Professors Ofer Eldar and Lorenzo Magnolfi found that Delaware
attracts large firms with sizeable institutional investor holdings compared to Nevada, lending support to
the idea most firms “dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for
officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the preferences of small firms.” Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi,
Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law, 11 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2685969 [https://perma.cc/58WJJHBF]. A similar line of empirical research is needed for understanding why domestic corporations are
opting into the corporate law of foreign nations despite Delaware’s longstanding dominance. Another
topic that may be worth investigating is whether and to what extent legal representation influences
incorporation decisions of firms choosing between popular offshore jurisdictions. In the domestic context,
the choice of legal representation has been found to be an important variable in incorporation decisions.
See Robert Anderson IV, The Delaware Trap: An Empirical Analysis of Incorporation Decisions, 91 S.
CAL. L. REV. 657, 662 (2018) (finding that the identity of a company’s law firm, then the legal needs of
a company, may drive jurisdictional choice).
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corporate law. Recall an important work by Professors Kahan and Kamar
that calls the very notion that American states compete for corporate charters
a “myth.” 232 According to their account, no state besides Delaware is actively
attempting to attract incorporations of public companies. 233 Their study sent
shockwaves through the legal academy at the time of its publication because
competition between suppliers of corporate law is a precondition to drawing
some of the most important normative conclusions in corporate law. 234 This
study reorients this literature. Even if we were to believe that the interstate
competition is a “myth,” 235 there are still jurisdictions—namely a handful of
entrepreneurial foreign nations—that are actively competing to gain a share
of Delaware’s lucrative corporate law empire.
At least in theory, the additional players in the corporate charter race
promise welfare gains by enabling optimal private choice. As in any market,
consumers (here, corporations) gain access to a higher number of sellers
(here, jurisdictions) and promise efficient, welfare-enhancing transactions. 236
This is particularly true if one adopts a nexus of contracts approach to
corporate law—viewing corporate law as standard form default rules that
happen to be produced by sovereign entities. 237 More “laboratories”
producing corporate law will, in some cases, also lead to the diffusion of
beneficial corporate law innovations across jurisdictions. 238
The emerging international corporate law market is thus reason for
celebration to those committed to the “race for the top” view. 239 A few
decades ago, Judge Winter of the Second Circuit lamented that the corporate
charter competition may be more of a “leisurely walk” than a “race” because
Delaware “is the only state devoted exclusively to maximizing franchise
taxes and may need only to offer a code marginally more efficient than other
232

Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 679.
Id. at 684.
234 Id. at 681.
235 Id. at 679.
236 A simple analogy may be useful to illustrate this point. Imagine that I am an avid consumer of
fast food. Instead of being limited to purchasing the Big Mac at McDonald’s, if I can choose the Junior
Bacon Cheeseburger at Wendy’s or the Whopper at Burger King, my happiness (or in economics
terminology, welfare) is enhanced. This is particularly true when competition encourages suppliers to
offer better (or innovative) products.
237 See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 38, at 1426.
238 The diffusion of LLCs across the United States that started with Wyoming is one example.
William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855,
857–59 (1995).
239 This includes Judge Easterbook and Professor Fischel, who assessed in their influential book that
fifty states are “perhaps too few to offer the complete menu of terms needed for the thousands of different
corporate ventures.” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 216.
233
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states.” 240 It is for this reason Judge Winter concluded that what may be
needed to improve American corporate law is “a second Delaware that
pursues franchise taxes and nothing else.” 241 Instead of the second state that
Judge Winter may have wished for, it appears that there are other nations
emerging as Delaware’s competition.
The fact that lawmakers in small foreign nations are easily “captured”
by the private sector, in certain respects, merely indicates lowered
transactional costs of producing desirable “off-the-rack” templates of
corporate law. 242 Thus, unlike domestic jurisdictions, where the large and
dispersed nature of constituents make it prohibitively expensive to produce
certain types of laws, “captured” lawmakers can swiftly enact legislative
reforms that reflect private sector preferences almost in real time.243
Indeed, one benevolent explanation for the emergence of offshore
corporate law havens is that they cater to corporations that want to hedge
against frivolous lawsuits. There is some evidence of this practice. For
instance, the rules in the Cayman Islands considerably limiting the
possibility of shareholder derivative suits have been described as aiming to
protect corporations from “vexatious or unfounded litigation.” 244 Moreover,
the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, unlike Bermuda, have
adopted fiduciary duty rules similar to Delaware’s instead of enacting rules
that eviscerate fiduciary duties altogether. 245 This suggests that even pure
private ordering does not necessarily result in the kind of managerialinterests-gone-wild scenario predicted by early “race for the bottom”
theorists. 246
240 Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1526, 1529 (1989).
241 Id.
242 See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1395, 1400 (1993).
243 As Professor Henry Hansmann explains, publicly traded firms rely on legislatures to adjust the
parties’ contract over time as circumstances demand. See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract,
8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 8–10 (2006).
244 Renova Res. Private Equity Ltd. v. Gilbertson [2009] CILR 268, 283.
245 See APPLEBY, GUIDE, supra note 225, at 9 (stating that Cayman law allows for indemnification
of both a company’s directors and officers against personal liability stemming from actions that involve
the company’s business while still maintaining the “irreducible core” of a fiduciary’s obligations).
246 See Cary, supra note 44, at 705 (“The absurdity of this race for the bottom, with Delaware in the
lead—tolerated and indeed fostered by corporate counsel—should arrest the conscience of the American
bar when its current reputation is in low estate.” (footnote omitted)). Indeed, not all restrictions on
traditional shareholder rights can necessarily be explained away as a race for the bottom phenomenon.
For instance, there is early empirical evidence that lax governance rules in Nevada (a jurisdiction that is
said to have adopted a “bottom feeder” strategy to attract corporations) actually increases—rather than
decreases—shareholder value. See Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value?
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It does not seem like shareholders are actively hostile to lax rules
offered in foreign nations, either. 247 In 2011, for instance, New York fashion
house Michael Kors went public on the New York Stock Exchange choosing
British Virgin Islands corporate law and raised nearly four billion dollars. 248
Opting out of American courts also means avoiding certain American
discovery procedures that can be unduly expensive. 249 This account seems to
be supported in part by the arbitration-like dispute resolution mechanism
offered by specialized business courts offshore. 250
But if one takes a broader conception of corporate governance rules—
a view that may accommodate concerns that corporate law may impact third
parties or society at large—the emergence of additional players in the
corporate charter race may have a range of consequences that may be
undesirable from a societal standpoint. 251 In the international context, there
are several unique reasons why we cannot take an expanded selection of
corporate law as necessarily promising socially desirable outcomes. First is
Evidence from Nevada, 61 J.L. & ECON. 555, 597 (2018) (presenting empirical evidence that Nevada
corporate law does not harm shareholder value—and may enhance the value—particularly for small firms
with low institutional shareholding and high insider ownership).
247 It bears noting that institutional owners hold a significant percentage of shares for many of these
firms. As of March 7, 2020, for instance, institutional owners held over 95% of Helen of Troy (a consumer
products company headquartered in El Paso, Texas, and incorporated in Bermuda), with BlackRock,
FMR, Vanguard, and Capital Research Global Investors holding the highest number of shares. Helen of
Troy Limited Common Stock (HELE) Institutional Holdings, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/marketactivity/stocks/hele/institutional-holdings [https://perma.cc/6V37-WQYU].
248 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Benefits of Incorporating Abroad in an Age of Globalization,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2011, 3:53 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/the-benefits-ofincorporating-abroad-in-an-age-of-globalization/ [https://perma.cc/6754-GZGX].
249 See Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: The
Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law”, 63 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1482 (2014)
(observing that discovery in American shareholder lawsuits is “not merely expensive; it subjects the
actions of the directors and officers, as well as the behavior of all company employees, to a level of
scrutiny that is virtually nonexistent in any other country”); see also Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery
Hydraulics, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1339 (2019) (“The perception that excessive document
discovery [in the United States] commonly leads to expensive and lengthy litigation processes is
widespread . . . .”).
250 These features are not unique to offshore business law courts. Professor Pam Bookman, for
instance, observed that emerging international commercial courts around the world are becoming more
“arbitrationalized,” borrowing some of arbitration’s most attractive features, including expert
adjudicators and confidentiality. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Adjudication Business, 45 YALE J. INT’L
L. (forthcoming 2020).
251 Of course, not everyone will agree that corporate law creates externalities. See, e.g., Easterbrook
& Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 38, at 1429–30 (“The corporation’s choice of governance
mechanisms does not create substantial third-party effects—that is, does not injure persons who are not
voluntary participants in the venture.”); see also Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and
Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 131 (2016) (observing the “divergence of opinion as to
whether the corporation ought to be viewed as purely private or, alternatively, as a social institution”).
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the ubiquity of tax. While incorporation decisions cannot purely be explained
as a problem of tax arbitrage, 252 current tax laws do allow corporations to
reduce tax liability by incorporating outside of the United States. 253
Incorporation decisions in the pure domestic context generally do not
implicate a substantial altering of effective tax liability because actual
territorial operations—as opposed to the place of incorporation—determine
state income taxes. 254 Consider, for instance, an automobile manufacturer
headquartered in Michigan. The company’s decision to incorporate in
Nevada or Delaware will have no bearing on state income taxes, for
Michigan, like other states, imposes taxes based on whether sufficient
activity occurs within its borders. It will also not affect federal taxes because
firms operating within the United States must pay federal taxes. The
company deciding to incorporate in the Cayman Islands, on the other hand,
will have dramatic federal tax implications. 255 This is because “under the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) corporate tax-residence is determined based
on the place of incorporation.” 256 For instance, Houston-headquartered
Cooper Industries, Inc. moved its place of incorporation from Ohio to
Bermuda, touting that it would “reduce its effective tax rate from about 35%
to 18–23%.” 257 To the extent that firms can continue to alter their effective
tax liability by incorporating in foreign jurisdictions, U.S. taxpayers are the
big third parties negatively affected by incorporation decisions of private
corporations.
To be sure, overall welfare effects of transnational corporate tax
arbitrage can be disputed. This is because corporations, as entities of legal
fiction, do not actually pay taxes—any tax on a corporate entity is passed
through to its shareholders, employees, customers, and suppliers. 258 The
252 See supra Section II.A; see also Darren Rosenblum, The Futility of Walls: How Traveling
Corporations Threaten State Sovereignty, 93 TUL. L. REV. 645, 645 (2019) (“Inversions—mergers in
which one firm merges with another abroad to avoid taxes in its home country—have spread as
globalization has reduced many of the transactional costs associated with relocating.”).
253 See Marian, supra note 61, at 2–3.
254 Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 108, at 1093–94.
255 See id.
256 Marian, supra note 61, at 3.
257 Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80 BROOK. L.
REV. 807, 827 (2015) (citing Cooper Indus., Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-4) 13–14 (June 11,
2001)).
258 See Kimberly A. Clausing, The Future of the Corporate Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 419, 419–23 (2013);
Michael P. Donohoe et al., Who Benefits from the Tax Advantages of Organizational Form Choice?, 68
NAT’L TAX J. 975, 976 (2015) (investigating “whether and to what extent four parties—customers,
suppliers, employees, and owners—benefit from the relative tax advantages of organizational form
choice”).
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incidence of the corporate tax has been extensively studied by economists,
who are inconclusive about where it falls. 259 But we do know with a
reasonable degree of certainty that it does not fall solely on shareholders.260
Thus, lower corporate taxes from a corporation headquartered in the United
States reincorporating abroad might in fact benefit the corporation’s
employees and customers by reducing how much of that tax they bear in
lower salaries and higher prices. 261 I am skeptical, though, whether this form
of tax savings can legitimately replace the function of tax revenues that are
the lifeblood of democratic governments. 262
Second, foreign jurisdictions may enable domestic corporations to opt
out of desirable mandatory rules that benefit society in general. The fact that
firms can opt out of mandatory rules using “captured” foreign lawmakers
should warrant further scholarly scrutiny, for “the mandatory nature of a law
is an indicator, and is perhaps the best evidence, that the law addresses
externalities in the private sector.” 263 In a classic piece widely considered to
be the most serious challenge to the “race for the top” account, Professor
Lucian Bebchuk argued that even if shareholders’ interests perfectly align
with those of managers, 264 we cannot assume that state charter competition
leads to socially desirable results. 265 This is because of the presence of
externalities, or impact on third parties. Therefore, the rules that maximize

259 See Arnold C. Harberger, Corporate Tax Incidence: Reflections on What Is Known, Unknown,
and Unknowable, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 283, 283 (John
W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008).
260 See Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, 20 TAX POL’Y
& ECON. 1, 1–4 (2006).
261 I am grateful to Professor Romano for her insights on this point.
262 See John Christensen & Richard Murphy, The Social Irresponsibility of Corporate Tax
Avoidance: Taking CSR to the Bottom Line, 47 DEVELOPMENT 37 (2004).
263 Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2001)
(emphasis omitted); see also William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCathery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 205,
231–32 (1997) (critiquing the idea that jurisdictional competition and the “devolution of regulatory
authority to the state and local level leads to competitive efficiency”).
264 Of course, it is important to note that the rise of institutional investors does not necessarily solve
the age-old agency problem endemic in corporate law. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst explain
that index funds like BlackRock—which own an increasingly large proportion of American publicly
traded companies—tend to underinvest in corporate stewardship. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst,
Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 2029, 2030 (2019) (“Our agency-costs analysis shows that index fund managers have strong
incentives to (i) underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively to the preferences and positions of
corporate managers.”).
265 Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1485.
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shareholder value may not be the most socially desirable. 266 Corporate law
issues that have been identified to involve significant externalities range
from the regulation of takeover bids and proxy contests, the protection of
creditors, the regulation of corporate disclosure, and the protection of
constituencies other than providers of capital. 267
While legal regime shopping enabled by entrepreneurial foreign nations
can strip away undesirable, and perhaps parochial, restraints on private
contracting, they can also undermine mandatory domestic rules designed to
effectuate important social policy. According to Professor Jeffrey Gordon,
for instance, “remedial devices such as the shareholder derivative suit could
be regarded as regulatory efforts to force the corporation to internalize the
cost of law compliance.” 268 Less tangibly but no less importantly, mandatory
rules may also shape corporate culture. 269 To the extent that these mandatory
rules are designed in part to remedy negative externalities, welfare gains
from international jurisdictional competition cannot be taken for granted.
To be clear, I do not contend that mandatory corporate governance rules
imposed by Delaware (and other American states) serve to protect the
general public in the same manner as public laws that mandate minimum
levels of drinking water quality or prohibit the sale of certain hallucinogenic
drugs. In corporate law, rules are designed principally to govern the
relationship between shareholders and managers. 270 But they necessarily
impact how the people who run corporations (managers) deal with other

266 Id.; see also Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons
from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 KAN. L. REV. 541, 544 (1995) (theorizing the possibility of
“market failure in the supply of corporate charters”).
267 Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1485–94.
268 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1551–
52 (1989). Other scholars argue that mandatory rules in corporate law serve to facilitate coordination
problems that can arise between relevant parties. Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach
to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1989) (“[A]
mandatory term may facilitate the coordination of the multiple contracts that constitute the corporation.”).
269 Thus, for instance, Professor Bernard Black observes that “[l]egal rules, such as the duty of
loyalty owed by managers to shareholders, can affect corporate norms.” Black, supra note 160, at 573;
see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 582, 590 (1984) (“The function of corporate law . . . is not to forcibly redirect evil human
nature onto the path of good, but to reinforce and give greater precision to the general inclination to do
right . . . .”); Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social
Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 777 (2007) (drawing on social psychology literature
showing that the “more often someone makes a commitment, the more likely she is to engage in
corresponding behavior”).
270 See Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes,
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 843 (1993).
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stakeholders, which could have vast societal consequences. 271 For instance,
a stricter duty to monitor the corporation imposed on directors and officers
at least in theory could help combat longstanding cultures of sexual
harassment that appear to be endemic in all too many corporations today. 272
This has important policy implications. If international competition
chips away at desirable mandatory rules that may not be feasible in the pure
domestic setting, it requires a renewed discussion as to the proper role of the
federal government in American corporate law. This is an area of intense
disagreement among leading scholars in the field, generally split between the
“race for the top” and “race for the bottom” schools. 273 Whereas this debate
has been thoroughly hashed out in the interstate context, there are simply too
many unanswered questions in the international context for legal scholars to
sit on the sidelines and celebrate every time mandatory rules are stripped
away in the name of efficiency and private choice.
271 For an excellent discussion of Delaware’s jurisprudence on board oversight, see Elizabeth
Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2016 (2019) (“Shareholders
cannot be counted on to police corporate illegality, and oversight failures may rarely rise to the level of
conscious disregard. The fiduciary duty of good faith is neither irrelevant nor toothless, however—it
embeds a safety valve for public policy in the obligations of fiduciaries that cannot be eliminated.”).
Examples abound documenting the socially undesirable outcomes produced by managers who are
presumably accountable to shareholders. See Danielle K. Citron, Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death
Videos: The Internet as It Is (and as It Should Be), 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (reviewing
NICK DRNASO, SABRINA (2018)) (“Right now, it is cheap and easy to wreak havoc online and for that
havoc to go viral. Platforms act rationally—some might say responsibly to their shareholders—when they
tolerate abuse that earns them advertising revenue and costs them nothing in legal liability.”); Sarah E.
Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 166–67 (2019) (arguing
that mandatory disclosure to investors is an important tool of environmental governance); Rory Van Loo,
The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563,
1582 (2019) (“One of the theoretical reasons why monitoring may be necessary beyond strong ex post
deterrence is that people operate in a boundedly rational manner that makes them underestimate the
likelihood of a bad event happening to them (and to the business they run), such as an oil spill or a bank
failure.”).
272 For a background on the link between sexual harassment and corporate law, see Daniel Hemel &
Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583 (2018).
273 Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1821 (2011) (arguing that Dodd-Frank and SOX “erode[] the system of
competitive federalism that is the unique genius of American corporate law by displacing state regulation
with federal law”), Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 731 (2013) (criticizing the “congressional usurpation of Delaware’s
traditional role in regulating corporate governance”), and Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529 (2005) (“The best path to
ameliorating the misguided congressional promulgation of substantive governance mandates through
SOX is to conform them to the states’ enabling approach to corporate law.”), with Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1793 (2006)
(“[T]he recurring need for federal officials to rectify state law failures in order to provide investors with
adequate protection indicates that federal lawmaking should be proactive rather than reactive.”).
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Perhaps most importantly, it is unclear if mandatory rules in Delaware,
and other American states, are byproducts of federal government oversight
or simply reflect the wishes of shareholders and managers. 274 In the pure
domestic context, the federal government at least theoretically disciplines
Delaware from enacting laws that are undesirable from society’s
standpoint—without actually federalizing corporate law. This is because the
federal government can usurp state power by federalizing corporate law.275
Foreign nations do not face such constraints because they are not subject to
federal oversight. Thus, foreign nations constitute a unique breed of
lawmakers that may need to be analyzed differently from other states like
Nevada. The international market at least in theory may be used by domestic
corporations to bypass mandatory rules found in state corporate law that
reflect, in part, latent federal oversight. 276
While robust empirical evidence should be a precondition to any major
reshaping of the federal government’s role in corporate law, 277 federal
intervention may be warranted if international competition is found to erode
state law-based mandatory rules designed to force private actors to
internalize negative externalities.278 To the extent that foreign nations allow
274 An alternative (and persuasive) explanation may be that mandatory rules reflect the wishes of
powerful local interest groups—namely the Delaware corporate lawyers that benefit from bringing and
defending shareholder lawsuits brought pursuant to these mandatory rules. See Macey & Miller, supra
note 43, at 472. Because Delaware faces negligible competition from other states, local lawyers can take
a sizable financial bite out of Delaware’s corporate law regime, even as proponents of competition argue
Delaware maintains “the best” corporate governance rules in the United States. See Kahan & Kamar,
Myth, supra note 28, at 742.
275 See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 5; see also Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note
5, at 1454 (assessing that Delaware may avoid certain risks in legislating corporate law because “adopting
such rules might trigger federal intervention”); Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of
Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1089 (2008) (“Delaware provides law in the shadow
of the threat of federal intervention, and from this vantage point preemption serves as the primary
discipline and motivation for efficient laws. Yet even here, the federal government cannot and does not
monitor all of Delaware’s lawmaking.” (footnote omitted)).
276 See Roe, Delaware and Washington, supra note 54, at 9–10 (attributing at least some parts of
Delaware corporate law as byproducts of latent federal government oversight).
277 After all, in some cases, institutional shareholders have been shown to play a significant role in
demanding governance frameworks that may be socially desirable. Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis &
David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund Activism and the New Millennial Corporate
Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
278 It is worth noting that there may be too little incentive for foreign nations to produce rules with a
broader societal interest in mind. Cf. Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1485 (“Note the
difference in this regard between federal and state law. If a rule is designed at the federal level, it is
possible that officials shaping this rule will take into account the interests of parties other than
shareholders. But if the rule is designed by the states, then the competition among them will lead state
law officials to exclude consideration of such interests.”). To be clear, I am not suggesting that the federal
government is immune to interest groups or has been particularly good at making sound corporate
governance rules.
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corporations to opt out of “immutable” rules in place under state law, these
may be the exact types of areas where leaving rules in the hands of
“captured” foreign lawmakers risks a lot more than what proponents of
jurisdictional competition may initially envision.
CONCLUSION
A new revolution is quietly emerging in corporate law. In recent
decades, a handful of small foreign nations have built sophisticated legal
infrastructures to commercialize their lawmaking authority into a staple
revenue stream. Aided in part by an elite cadre of foreign lawyers who stand
to benefit from the development of offshore corporate law havens,
entrepreneurial foreign nations in offshore islands are emerging suppliers of
“cutting-edge” corporate law. These jurisdictions, unlike New York or
California, offer some of the most unadulterated forms of corporate
governance rules reflecting private sector preferences, setting the stage for a
globalizing market for corporate law.
The emergence of an international corporate charter market has been
largely undetected by domestic corporate law scholars who have for decades
presupposed an interstate market for corporate law. In addition to
complicating and refining the race metaphor, this Article highlights the need
to scrutinize whether unadulterated private ordering built around efficiency
goals is the only game in town. Until we are comfortable leaving corporate
governance rules to “captured” lawmakers in small foreign nations, policy
prescription presupposing interstate corporate charter competition ought to
be interrogated from the ground up.
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